Jared Kushner's alleged attempts to set up a back-channel communications with the Kremlin is probably not, as far as I can tell from listening to the pundits, in and of itself criminal. However, there are a number of points to be made.
1) It is quite different from Obama's comment to Medvedev in 2012 which was a communication between two heads of state in public, not between an advisor and a spy in private.
2) As John Brennan pointed out in has riveting testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last week, there are very well developed protocols for setting up such communications, including bringing into the loop senior civil servants who can ensure that no compromising information is divulged. These protocols were ignored.
3) Until more information emerges, there seem to be two possible explanations for this very odd request to Kislyak (and these could be two ends of a continuous spectrum of nefariousness). The first and most benign is that this was a genuine if naive attempt to improve relations with Russia, but that the relatively young and inexperienced Kushner was in over his head. It was arrogant and foolish of him to think he could pull this off, but given his father-in-law's world-view, not completely surprising. At the other end of the scale we have the possibility that influence was being sold, literally, or that a means of 'repayment' in favors for handing Trump the election was being established.
It it's either of these last two, well that's not good.
Monday, May 29, 2017
Sunday, May 21, 2017
Trump's Middle East Strategy
Donald Trump's middle east strategy seems to have two strands; real-politik and the building of a Sunni Arab coalition. First, in his words, Trump will not be constrained by "rigid ideology". In other words, US foreign policy will be abandoning a commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights in favor of real-politik. Trump has already signalled his lack of concern for civil rights abuses by authoritarial and illiberal regimes in Egypt (not to mention Indonesia and Russia, whose leaders he has praised). In continuing to supply armaments to the Saudi's but without the moral concerns, for example, concerning the use of banned cluster munitions in Yemen, he is pursuing a transactional approach, consistent with a real-politik doctrine. He hopes to make gains in security and stability through the exercise and projection of power, both directly and by supporting authoritarian leaders and illiberal regimes, eve if that means ditching the "rigid ideology" of concerns over human rights and a commitment to democracy.
The second plank is bringing to together the Sunni Arab states in a security partnership to constrain Iran, the dominant Shia power in the region. However, creating and supporting a Sunni regional coalition risks undoing the improvement in relations with Iran which could lead to the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and emboldening Sunni resistance in Iraq which will complicate the US-Iraqi relationship.
Leaving aside the question of human rights and concerns about democracy, there are reasons to worry that any short term gains in regional stability and security will be outweighed in the medium and long term. If Iran decides that it is no longer on a path to re-integration in trade and diplomacy, it may chose to abandon the nuclear deal signed with the US, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, Germany and The EU in 2015. That would put it back on track to a nuclear weapon in about two years, completely reordering the balance of power in the region. The focus would then turn to the regions two nuclear powers, Iran and Israel.
In the longer term, the abandoning of American ideals will not play well in the region, at least in the 'Arab street'. The reason America was so reviled in Iran was because it was propping up an authoritarian regime; the revolution that followed installed an virulently anti-American theocratic regime which, despite the efforts of pragmatic Iranian reformers, remains so to this day. The failure of the Arab Spring to deliver meaningful democratic reform in Egypt has left much of the population angry not only at Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's autocratic regime but, to the extent that he is propped up by the US, at America too. The same disconnect between the rulers and the street applies to Saudi Arabia, and to some degree in Jordan. As Iran shows, those feelings of antipathy and resentment for past failures last for generations. Trump's policy may deliver gains while he is in office, but will make things considerably harder for his successors.
The second plank is bringing to together the Sunni Arab states in a security partnership to constrain Iran, the dominant Shia power in the region. However, creating and supporting a Sunni regional coalition risks undoing the improvement in relations with Iran which could lead to the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and emboldening Sunni resistance in Iraq which will complicate the US-Iraqi relationship.
Leaving aside the question of human rights and concerns about democracy, there are reasons to worry that any short term gains in regional stability and security will be outweighed in the medium and long term. If Iran decides that it is no longer on a path to re-integration in trade and diplomacy, it may chose to abandon the nuclear deal signed with the US, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, Germany and The EU in 2015. That would put it back on track to a nuclear weapon in about two years, completely reordering the balance of power in the region. The focus would then turn to the regions two nuclear powers, Iran and Israel.
In the longer term, the abandoning of American ideals will not play well in the region, at least in the 'Arab street'. The reason America was so reviled in Iran was because it was propping up an authoritarian regime; the revolution that followed installed an virulently anti-American theocratic regime which, despite the efforts of pragmatic Iranian reformers, remains so to this day. The failure of the Arab Spring to deliver meaningful democratic reform in Egypt has left much of the population angry not only at Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's autocratic regime but, to the extent that he is propped up by the US, at America too. The same disconnect between the rulers and the street applies to Saudi Arabia, and to some degree in Jordan. As Iran shows, those feelings of antipathy and resentment for past failures last for generations. Trump's policy may deliver gains while he is in office, but will make things considerably harder for his successors.
Saturday, May 6, 2017
If you see something...
Dr. Mary Papazian was inaugurated on Thursday as San Jose State's 30th president. In her inaugural address, she made repeated reference to the Armenian Genocide [1] [2]. A colleague noted that the whole week of inaugural activities was about Armenia - including two movies about the genocide. Then she asked "Do you think she should not have made such references"?
It's a tough call and raises a number of issues. First, where to draw the line between the re-assertion of history and the making of political points. University leaders probably should not be overtly political since that may impede free speech; but they should stand up for truth over the re-interpretation of history. Another similar case would be countering holocaust deniers. Then there is the question of timing. Should it be driven only a rise in history revisionists, or at any major public event that will have some press coverage regardless of the external environment, or at any opportunity where the message might make a difference (such as the introduction of a speaker to a campus event or at graduation).
My sense is that it was appropriate. Turkey is becoming more authoritarian, the freedom of the press is being curtailed, the regime would much prefer the Armenian Genocide to disappear and will no doubt be trying to make sure that happens in all domestic media and as much of the international media as it can intimidate. So against that background, given my earlier argument about revisionism, I’d say she did the right thing.
It's a tough call and raises a number of issues. First, where to draw the line between the re-assertion of history and the making of political points. University leaders probably should not be overtly political since that may impede free speech; but they should stand up for truth over the re-interpretation of history. Another similar case would be countering holocaust deniers. Then there is the question of timing. Should it be driven only a rise in history revisionists, or at any major public event that will have some press coverage regardless of the external environment, or at any opportunity where the message might make a difference (such as the introduction of a speaker to a campus event or at graduation).
My sense is that it was appropriate. Turkey is becoming more authoritarian, the freedom of the press is being curtailed, the regime would much prefer the Armenian Genocide to disappear and will no doubt be trying to make sure that happens in all domestic media and as much of the international media as it can intimidate. So against that background, given my earlier argument about revisionism, I’d say she did the right thing.
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