March [1] suggests two competing "logics" of choice; a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness. I argue here that this categorization scheme applies well to the Washington establishment and beyond.
Literature
In the best tradition of Rupert's fake news station, no prior literature will be mentioned. To pay attention to earlier work is too constraining and time consuming.
Theory
Proposition 1: Republicans are more likely than Democrats to use a logic of appropriateness, while Democrats are more likely than Republicans to use a logic of consequences.
Methods
A detailed ethnographic study spanning 10 years and 9 months was carried out. A grounded theory-building approach was employed [2]. News broadcasts, televised interviews with politicians, and subject behavior in the two Houses of Congress (CSPAN) were scrutinized. Statements were eventually coded "0" for "makes no sense whatsoever / defies all logic" and "1" for "I can follow that line of reasoning".
Results
Table 1 presents the findings.
Dem | GOP | |
"Makes no sense" | Some | LOTS |
"I can see some logic there" | LOTS | Some |
The results may include some rounding errors.
Discussion
Decision making using logic of consequence is more cognitively demanding (like chess) than a logic of appropriateness that relies more on identity/situation recognition (like snap). A logic of appropriateness enables faster decision making which, in stable environments, is advantageous from a species standpoint. Speculating as to how we got here, one might reasonably posit a population ecology-based explanation [3]. Natural selection during the post WWII period of economic growth and fairly stable, though not uncontested, world order favored this mode over a logic of consequence. It is manifest in visceral judgments, a lack of nuance, and extreme simplification (us vs them, good vs evil, right vs wrong - the use of just two categories reduces cognitive load).
Furthermore, because it doesn't rely on strict consequential logic, but pattern matching heuristics, the possibility of contradictory positions is allowed for, since internal consistency is not central to this cognitive scheme. For example the Norwegian mass murderer, Anders Breivik, "cannot be a Christian", according to William O'Riley, (despite the former's claims acting in the name of Christianity) while terrorists from say Afghanistan or Iraq must ipso facto be radical Muslims. Or, supporting organizations channeling funds to the IRA to buy explosives and guns is perfectly acceptable while supporting terrorist organizations, specifically Hezbollah, is not.
Limitations
Clearly, as with any study of this kind, generalization is an issue. The central question is: Are members of congress representative of the population? I suspect not. Moreover, there may be a sample selection bias. Statements such as "Anybody foolish enough to invest their money with the United States Government knowing our condition deserves to lose their money” (Mark Williams, Talk Show Host, Author and Public Speaker, talking about buyers of US Treasury securities), or "The American people are looking for someone who will say no. I will be that person… I won't raise taxes. I will reduce spending. I won't vote to raise the debt ceiling. And I have the titanium spine to see it through." (Michelle Bachmann, Minnesota (R-MN)), have a higher salience, at least for this researcher, that may lead to an over-sampling of statements lacking in carefully articulated reasoning. Nevertheless, this sampling bias is not necessarily more problematic for one or other category on the other dimension and therefore may not invalidate the findings.
Conclusion
Although data collection has spanned a number of years, the study was not designed longitudinally to establish causality; therefore we can only speculate as to the reasons for what we see. Nevertheless, given the rapidly increasing pace of change [4], species that have evolved to be increasingly well fit to their environments in periods of stability may be most vulnerable to radical discontinuities.
While a follow on study might shed additional light on this question, currently a lack of state university research funding, a consequence of cuts in state and federal spending on higher education, a declining tax base, ever higher proportions of low wage US jobs, if and when they are created (e.g. unemployed HP engineers now working as WalMart greeters), high unemployment, a falling stock market, a collapsed housing market and depressed real estate prices, low consumer confidence, and general long term economic decline, mitigates against a more extensive sampling.
References
[1] March, J. G. (1994). A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen, Free Press.
[2] Glaser, B. J. and A. L. Straus (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago, Aldine.
[3] Hannan, M. T. and J. Freeman (1977). "The Population Ecology of Organizations." American Journal of Sociology 82(5): 929-963.
[4] Rumelt, R. Personal Communication, 1994
Apparently not completely without foundation. To the extent that fear means people "cannot hope to think truly about many matters of great importance" (Bertrand Russel, 1950) my (unscientific) observation appears to have some basis in science: "Fear as a Disposition and an Emotional State: A Genetic and Environmental Approach to Out-Group Political Preferences"
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