Sanctions

(c) Economist 2022

The sanctions regime deployed by the West and others to persuade Russia to halt its invasion of Ukraine is by all accounts the most draconian and consequential ever imposed on a large industrial economy. Nevertheless, there are two reasons to think they will not halt the Russian invasion nor prevent Putin from deposing Ukraine's legitimate government.

The first is and overarching reason is timing. Sanctions, even those just implemented, despite already having profound effects on the Russian economy, are widely thought to require weeks or months to achieve their desired effect. But Ukraine likely has only days not weeks in which it can hold out. 

The second is the mechanism. Sanctions are meant to be persuasive at several levels; on Putin himself, on his oligarchs and on the Russian people as a whole.  They will not deter Putin personally since for him this is no longer about his personal wealth but about power, control, his standing as a world leader, and his grandiose ambitions to reconstruct the old USSR.  If he wins he stays in power and will have access to all the money he wants. For Putin, alternatives to a win are two; he backs down, but remains in office (in the totalitarian state he has built he will never loose another election) although his standing on the world stage will be reduced to pariah. But if he refuses to back down, the end results is the same. So there is no upside for him to back down now. 

Sanctions on the oligarchs will only cause Putin to change course if the oligarchs collectively believe he can be deposed; while Putin remains in power, they are beholden to him for their wealth, at least that not yet frozen by the West, but more importantly for their future earnings. They have no real power themselves unless they can either persuade the Russian parliament to act to curb Putin's power or persuade the Russian military to mount a coup.  Both the military and members of the Duma must in turn weigh the chances of success; should legislative measures to rein Putin or a coup fail, all those involved, directly or indirectly, will likely face long prison or death sentences. Weighing such odds depends on an assessment of outcome probabilities. That in turn depends on a critical mass willing to support such a course of action. Developing that critical mass takes many quiet conversations and time. 

The last mechanism by which sanctions act is through their effect on the Russian people. The there are only two ways in which ordinary Russians get any say. The first is through the ballot box. But not only is an election too far distant to matter, even were an election to be held tomorrow, because Putin controls the press, the media and hence the narrative, he would likely win even without rigging the election. Oddly, sanctions work to Putin's advantage. As the Iran's Ayatollahs have done since sanctions were imposed on their country, Putin will telling the Russian people that their suffering is due to evil regimes in the West who are trying to destroy Mother Russia. 

Where does this leave Ukraine? If sanctions are the only tool the West is prepared to use against Putin, Ukraine will fall; it may take weeks rather than the days Putin had hoped, but in the medium term the end is the same.  A Putin-friendly puppet regime will be installed, freedom of speech will be harshly curbed using the same tactics as Putin is now using in Russia, and Ukrainians will be subjugated into the new Russian empire.  They may fight an insurgency but displacing another pro-Russian leader from their country will be far more difficult than the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych. Putin may even reinstall Yanukovych, someone who was not only loyal to Putin when he was president before, but like so many of those Putin has promoted and richly rewarded, he will owe his position entirely to Putin's largess. Putin was upset by Yanukovych's ouster in 2014 and will make sure not to let that happen again.  

If sanctions are an ineffective tool, what then? If only military action is sufficient to stop Putin's current, not to mention future land-grabs, does the West have the stomach for what could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust?  That, sadly, is a question we will be facing in the weeks ahead.

Confiscating personal assets

Several countries including the US and the UK announced yesterday that they are moving to confiscate the personal assets of a number of wealthy Russian oligarchs. While the logic is clear and the cause is just, it raises a troubling question about property rights and the rule of law.  

It may set an uncomfortable precedent that property rights are only inviolate when its suits a particular government in whose country those assets reside. It signals that if politically expedient, foreigners' rights may be abrogated. 

There has always been political risk in investing abroad, but it was general accepted that in Western democracies that were upholders of the international rules based order, property rights would be upheld.  But by abandoning this principle, it will be harder for those countries to protest when their citizens' assets are confiscated in other countries; what a "just cause" is that makes such seizures legitimate depends to some degree on ones point of view. 

This increase the uncertainty for companies and individuals investing abroad and that may have negative implications for the global economy.  Of course one might argue that it has always been so; Israel has been stealing land from the Palestinians with impunity for years (although that's the only example that immediately comes to mind).      

Reflection

Tonight, as the Russian soldiers being their assault on Kyiv, I thought I should stop thinking about abstractions like the "Pax Americana" or the importance of the "international order" and turn my thoughts to the forty four million people, suddenly upended by one megalomaniac's obsession. 

My father's family fled Czechoslovakia just ahead of the Nazi invasion, just as many Ukrainians are doing today.  The family escaped to Sweden, and my father to London. He arrived with no English just on one trunkful of belongings, working as a technician at the London Hospital during the day, with the Germans bombing the city at night. One of my aunts moved to new York, taught arts and crafts at the Braerley school, studying at night to become a psychoanalyst. My other aunt and her husband moved back to Czechoslovakia after the war. In 1968 they saw Russian tanks on the streets of their home town, Prague. My my family is well acquainted with the trauma of having to flee before an invading army and of having to endure Russian occupation. So I am filled with great sadness and empathy for the people of Ukraine. We are, as a species, no better now than we ever were. The progress we may have made in material things has not been matched by progress in stemming our greed, our thirst for power, our capacity for indifference and cruelty.   

And so, as I sit here in the comfort of a warm home without having to worry whether I will die tonight from enemy bombs, or have to leave the place I call home with little more than I can carry, I am grateful. And I wonder how we could have let this happen again? How could we have thought that diplomacy and non-military means would stop an autocrat bent on war? How did we delude ourselves that tanks and troops on the Ukrainian border were not there for the exact purpose for which they were built? How is it that somehow we failed to learn from history? 

Why sanctions won't work

In response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the West is proposing "stiff sanctions". Simply put they will not work. First, to prevent Putin from effecting regime change in Ukraine, they would have to bite within a week; that as long as one might reasonably expect the Ukrainians to hold out against the Russian onslaught. Within a week, Putin will likely have deposed Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky and installed his own interim administration. But sanctions won't have desired effect in that short a time; they cause problems over weeks not days and Putin has already buffered himself and Russia from their impact, further lessening their efficacy. 

Sanctions will also have two unwelcome consequences for the West. First, they will cause problems for ordinary Russians which will only serve to bolster Putin's hold on power. Just as the Iran theocracy blames the country's woes on Western sanctions, so will Putin. Secondly, sanctions will also impact businesses in in the West that currently trade with, or do business in, Russia. Over time as the America public comes to accept the Russian installed regime as a "new normal", opposition to lifting sanctions will subside and business interests will prevail. 

One can see how ineffective they are in the US' policy toward China and Afghanistan. China's stance towards the US has hardened in the last five year despite tariffs and sanctions against Hwawei. North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons. Iran is continuing to enrich uranium. And the Taliban is not becoming more liberal in its attitudes towards women while the Afghan people starve; because of that the West will change course before China, North Korean, or the Taliban. And while sanctions remain in place, Russia will seek to develop trading relations with other countries, further reducing both their medium term impact and making them still less effective as a future deterrent.  

That makes President Biden's reported statement that were Russia to attack a member of the NATO alliance, "the use of military force is not off the table" significant.  It means that the use of military force is not an inevitable consequence were Putin to move against a NATO country in Europe. Given the futility of sanctions and the possibility that Putin could threaten and invade NATO member countries without a military response from the West, he must now feel he has considerably more freedom to act as he pleases.

The Endgame in Ukraine

Eugene Robinson suggested today that two hundred thousand troops may be enough to defeat the Ukrainian military but not sufficient to hold the country. That misses the point. Putin will remove Zelenskyy, the elected president, and in his place establish an interim government. He'll run a rigged election and install a Russian puppet in Kyiv. He will maintain that all this will be "in complete accordance with the Ukrainian constitution".  He does not need to hold the country with soldiers on the streets; he needs only a pliant Ukrainian administration, at which point his tanks can return home to Russia. 

Putin's hold on power

There has been some discussion about how Putin's invasion of Ukraine will impact his popularity at home. His answer may be "I don't care". As long as he continues to rig elections, as has has likely done in the past, and controls the security apparatus, he has little to fear. He can't be voted out of office and any protests, should they arise, will be met with a swift crack down, and the arrest or untimely demise, accidental or otherwise, of its leaders. His position is secure as long has he can continue to pay those he needs to carry out his orders. Given his control over the state coffers, that looks unlikely to change any time soon.  

Afghanistan

There are two schools of thought on withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan. One is that Al-Qaeda has been dispersed and the threat is no longer localized in Afghanistan, so keeping troops there is not an effective use of the military's resources. Moreover, in removing troops from Afghan soil, the Taliban may find less local support making common cause against the invading infidel.  The other is that the Taliban remain a threat to the Afghan government and without an American presence they may will retake control of the country. The modernizing reforms achieved since the US occupation began would be rescinded and the country would revert to the oppressive values the Taliban espouse. 

Where one comes down on this probably hinges on whether one sees the US' role in the world providing a policing presence or as exporting its values (or for some people, neither).  If one sees the US' role only as policing or simply defending the homeland then the troop withdrawal is the obvious answer. If one still sees the US' role as exporting its values, then it should have stayed. 

That Biden chose to leave suggests either that a more inwardly focused perspective is taking hold here (some would characterize it as the "America First" position) or that there has finally been a realization that imposing values on another sovereign nation with a completely different culture and history is harder than it looks. It requires a sustained, often heavy-handed presence which those being "asked" to reform might justifiably see as colonization.

A new world order

The first two decades of the 21st century has seen a marked shift in the old century's world order. Russian belligerence has risen, authoritarianism has resurfaced in Eastern Europe, putting stress on the EU, compounded by Britain's departure. And then there is China's rise. As its economic power grew so did its influence, and outward expression of self-confidence.

Almost 200 years after James Monroe articulate what has become the Monroe Doctrine, China is embarking on a similar policy, driving out U.S. influence (what it see as interference) in its back yard. It is shaping a new world order.

Two things are accelerating that process. The first is Donald Trump, directly. He has helped China in two ways; first his abandoning of allies has weakened any collective response to China's newfound assertiveness. Second, by underestimating Xi's political and negotiating skills, not to mention his ability to outlast Trump, and by overestimating his own, he has provided China with a strategic opportunity which has used that to extend its influence globally. Already playing a long game, China has exploited the vacuum created by Trump's unwillingness and inability to play a role on the world stage.

The second is covid-19; America's botched handling of the crisis has further damaged the U.S.' reputation, and in particular highlighted many of the weaknesses of its model of democratic government, not to mention is values.  And much of that again can be laid squarely on Trump's ignorance, incompetence, and lack of seriousness in his approach to his job.

The 21st century will be a have different world order; and Trump's tenure will have a lot to do with how much diminished America's role in that order will be.

A Flawed Deal

The "Deal of the Century" as Trump, with uncharacteristic humility, is calling Jared's plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is dommed; but that may not be unintentional. Like so much of Trump's initiatives it's more about the sizzle and less about the steak, how it plays on TV rather than what it might actually accomplish.

At least as being reported, the plan legitimizes the settlements Israel built in the West Bank; it does not guarantee right of return; it does not halt but only temporarily freezes further annexation of disputed land in the West Bank and Israel may well continue to expand its settlements. And in return there is a promise, unlikely to be kept, for $50 billion to support the new quasi-independent State of Palestine. 

The plan reflects Kushner's inexperience and naivety; offering a deal that is in essence a very large bribe is not a viable solution to three generations of killing and hatred, as anyone from Northern Ireland could have told him. Second, he appears not to have learned anything from the US' nation-building debacle in Iraq (or for the matter in post cold war Russia). The institutions of a well functioning society cannot be created out of thin air. Their efficacy depends on trust, which takes years to build (and much less time to erode as his father-in-law is so deftly demonstrating).           

However given international reaction, particularly in the Arab world, this is likely to be the end of any serious support for Palestinian statehood. The world, it seems, has grown tired of 70 years of conflict and now simply wants to turn away and move on.

What that means for the stability of the region is an open question; my worst case scenario prediction is that the region will unfold as another ugly Syria-esque situation. The Palestinians will refuse the deal, violence will increase, Israel will do much as Bashar Al Assad did and create a refugee crisis as it annexes the Gaza strip and the West Bank; and the world, increasingly nationalistic and inwardly focused, will eventually come to terms with the de facto reality on the ground. 

David Brooks on hyperventilation: a Reply

David Books, whose analysis on The PBS News Hour I watch religiously and deeply appreciate wrote an article in yesterday's NYT suggesting that Trump is bringing us all down to his level and that his detractors are making counter arguments in similarly over-hyped and simplistic terms. As evidence he cited Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren's concerned about the possibility of going to war with Iran. While I agree that Donald Trump (and his boosters on Fox) tend to frame things in stupifyingly simplistic terms, I disagree that one should not have been very concerned by recent events.

First, the killing of a high profile Iranian military leader and political figure came with enormous risk, in part because there was little precedent to guide our understanding of Iran’s response.  Second, Trump's public statements, and the comments made by those who have worked with him suggest, as Books noted, an impulsive generally uninformed decision making process. Third, it is unclear that Trump is consistent in his choices, appearing to go with the whim of the moment, or the choice that seems to appeal most to his base; just because he has said in the past he doesn’t want war does not preclude him embracing it in the future. Finally, it has been suggested that extreme and unexpected choices are particularly appealing to him. All of which suggests that as terrible a choice as going to war with Iran would likely be for the US and the region, it was not unthinkable that he would chose this course. Indeed, the somber tone of the Fox and Friends and Fox News anchors yesterday seems to indicate that they considered this a distinct possibility. So I do think we had cause for concern. 

Asymmetric Warfare

Iran's carefully calibrated retaliation for the killing of Qasem Suleimani shows how astute  Iran's leadership is. The missile strike allowed it to appease an already angry domestic audience, to demonstrate its improved technological capabilities, all without killing or even injuring any Americans which would have made US retaliation inevitable. That was needle very carefully threaded. The contrast with the White House is stark and illustrates another sense in which Iran and the US are in an asymmetric struggle; the US has the stronger military, but Iran clearly has the smarter leader.

The Sound of Silence

With the US and Iran on the brink of war, what has been striking over the last 48 hours is the conspicuous silence of world leaders. One explanation, given that I write this from within the USA, is that the US media's focus on Trump and Iran blocks out everything else. But looking at the press' response in Europe the silence is deafening.

Le Monde on its website today has no coverage of Trump's address at all.  The Frankfurter Allgemeine notes Germany's foreign minister condemning the Iranian missile strike but calling for de-escalation; no comment from Angela Merkel.  Britain's Foreign Secretary made a similar statement yesterday, but the Guardian and the Telegraph both focused on the Prime Minister's difficulties with getting Brexit done. One can only assume that there was either tacit or explicit agreement amongst the allies that any public comments suggesting de-escalation would be counterproductive, given Trump's strained relations with European leaders, and that private communications would be more effective. They seem to have concluded that allowing Trump to take the limelight and the credit for stating the obvious is an important prerequisite to achieving their international policy goals.         

An almost presidential address

Today was a pivotal moment in history: how would Trump respond to the previous day's ballistic missile strike by Iran? In an address to the nation, clearly warranted given the gravity of the situation Trump had largely created through the assassination of Qasem Suleimani, his challenge was two-fold; how to appear presidential and speak for the nation and what to do given the current situation. He managed, surprisingly, to steer a better course than expected on policy, but managed to not quite hit the mark on tone.

On policy, he stepped back from the brink and elected not to respond militarily to Iran's strike. That is to be applauded. Whether his fear of foreign entanglements in the run up to the next election or his military advisers were responsible for this decision is as yet unclear but the outcome is nonetheless welcome. The decision to de-escalate and not respond militarily is a momentous change in direction.
The path forward he set out is astonishingly multilateral, involving the original signatories to the JCPOA and NATO, an organization whose relevance he has repeatedly questioned. He appeared to be opening the door to negotiations, though given the gravity of the last few days it will be some time before Iran will be able to enter into dialog; Iran's domestic audience would not countenance a rapid resumption of talks. 

On tone, he clearly struggled but on balance managed to come across as "mostly presidential". He stuck to the carefully worded script and no off the cuff additions. His tone of voice was appropriately somber. He didn't mention his Congressional adversaries or impeachment. He couldn't, however, resist taking a jab at his predecessor, and repeated the lie that Obama had "given" Iran billions of dollars.

Moving forward, the promised sanctions afford a degree to flexibility in severity that a military response would have precluded.  The GOP will claim victory (with the killing of Suleimani) and Iran will too (with a militarily un-answered the missile strike), and the world will have narrowly avoided another calamitous war. Everyone can now exhale. 

Fox Blinks

The guests on Fox this morning were unanimous in calling for de-escalation. Neither did the more news-worthy hosts on at 7am adopt their customary bellicose swagger. One even pressed a GOP member of Congress on the imminence of the attack on which the killing of Suleimani was predicated, an uncharacteristically aggressive question for a Fox anchor.  Even the "Fox & Friends" show, usually among the most ridiculous crews the network has to offer, had moved from its usual couch-based format to a desk.

With reality staring them starkly in the face, Fox' presenters (and presumably producers) blinked. One can only hope that coming to grips with the consequences of unhinged bravado will lead to a more serious approach to its job both on the news and the propaganda sides of the network.

Choosing one's words carefully

Mike Pompeo, when questioned today about Trump's threat to bomb cultural sites in Iran, maintained adamantly that the administration would not break the law. He was, however, careful not to mention bombing of cultural sites in his answer.

He could have replied quite simply that the administration would not bomb cultural sites, yet on several occasions he used the same language about not breaking the law and did not say explicitly that cultural sites would be off-limits.

There seem to be two possible explanations. One is that he is being careful not to contradict his boss explicitly, but that presupposes Trumps is too dense to see "not breaking the law" as meaning not bombing cultural sites. And while I have my doubts about Trump's claim of being a "very stable genius", I doubt that he couldn't make that connection.

That leaves the the alternative explanation; that the administration believes either it has found a legal justification for bombing cultural sites (much in the same was that Cheaney and Busy sought to find a legal justification for torturing detainees), or that it does not recognise the jurisdiction of a supranational legal system, and since there may not be any US laws precluding such action, they would thus deem it legal.

Missing from all the discussion of its legality, the central question must be what would it accomplish? The answer is nothing of any benefit militarily, but it would certainly inflame anti-American sentiments in the Middle East. 

The Moment of Truth Arrives

Iran this evening responded to Donald Trump's assassination of Qasem Suleimani but launching a ballistic missile strike from within Iran at US military targets in Iraq. A demonstrable response was expected.  As well informed commentators noted (and as I did also) this was in part an inevitable effort to placate an angry domestic audience that was aggrieved that its sovereignty has been violated.

From what is being reported, the strike appears to have been carefully designed and calibrated to signal Iran's capabilities and its willingness to use them, while at the same time causing relatively few casualties, none of whom appear to be American.  It provides a turning point at which deescalation might be achieved; the strike assuages Iranian domestic ire but does so without crossing Trump's red-line of another American death.

This is a moment of truth for Trump and the country.

His choice is clear. He can back down from his intemperate tweeting and ill-considered impulsive decision making, and turn instead to the diplomats to talk both sides down from the ledge. Of course, that's problematic since Mike Pompeo, who is more consistently bellicose than Trump, heads the State Department. But that would be the thoughtful, statesman-like and courageous move. And I very much doubt he's is up to it.

A more likely outcome is that his insecurity, vanity and fear of appearing to lose face will prevail; he will up the ante with a strike against targets inside Iran, to all intents and purposes thereby declaring war. If this is where we are headed, Trump will have single-handedly started a war of choice.

His decision in the next few hours could reshape the world order and have irrevocable consequences for years to come; it is, without doubt, the most critical moment, not only of his presidency, but the most momentous for the country since deciding to invade Iraq.
 
While Trump must take responsibility for the mess we are now in and the graver one we likely will be in by tomorrow, the GOP must shoulder an appreciable portion of blame. Its failure to stand up to Trump makes it complicit; its members stood quietly by as he emerged as the front-runner in the 2016 primaries; they allowed him to lie to the public on a daily basis without challenge or correction; many of them blithely repeated his lies; they looked the other way as he violated the constitution and the separation of powers. They have created a monster (or at least allowed one to assume the throne) and we will all be the lucky beneficiaries as he continues to flounder, causing mayhem and carnage. For any thinking Americans now having second thoughts about their voting choices in 2016, all I can say is "you had fair warning".

Why now, why this?

It is taken as read that Qasem Suleimani was engaged in actions that led to the death of many Americans. How he might be held to account is a complicated question (unless you are one of the mind-numbingly infantile Fox News crowd from whom everything is "real simple"). He was a government official in another country; it is unlikely that he would ever be held accountable in the US, although a case might be brought the ICC. Trump, who does no acknowledge that any supranational body has jurisdiction will argue that since he can't be brought to justice in the US, extrajudicial killing was the only option. But holding Suleimani to account for his past is not what the administration is arguing was the justification for the attack. It is claiming that it was necessary to prevent an imminent attack on US persons, and thus was permissible under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the War Powers Act.  That's the legal justification for not consulting Congress. A Congressional declaration of war would have been not only unlikely to pass but would have made any covert operation impossible. So an AUMF- or War Powers Act-based authorization may have been appropriate.       

If so, two question need answers. First is why now? So far the administration has been circumspect as to the nature and timing of the imminent attack. So we need to know what the intelligence community concluded was being planned and when. This gets messy, first because the question only arises because the AUMF was invoked. And its use is contingent on the choice of action to be taken to respond to Iran's escalating meddling

The second question, and arguably the larger one, is not whether to have struck back, but how. There is a good case that to do nothing in response to the killing of an American contractor given the history of Iran's and its proxies actions (the strike against the Saudi refinery, the mining of tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, and the downing of a US drone), would be taken as weakness and a license for Iran to push further in an effort to extract concessions on economically crippling sanctions. Diplomatic channels, for whatever reason, were no longer a viable means of curtailing Iran's activities. That is largely a function of a choice made by this administration in favoring confrontation and threats of force over diplomacy.  But the question of whether killing someone who was the Iranian equivalent of the Director of National Security of the CIA Director was the most effective way of dealing with Iran's posture is critical. Likely a menu of retaliatory actions were presented to Trump - indeed it appears it was something Pompeo had been discussion privately for some months - and it is possible that this was presented to Trump as a target of opportunity, an opportunity he took thinking it would help him win the next election. It is almost certain, given what we know about his management "style", that he made the decision impulsively with no clear understanding of its ramifications. As Oliver Hardy might have said "Well here's another fine mess you've gotten us into".

Assassination, war crimes and other language

If the US is not at war with Iran, then the extrajudicial killing of Suleimani is an assassination, that is the killing of a prominent persona, a senior government or a political figure in peace time. And since a declaration of war, an authority granted by the Constitution to Congress alone, has not been made, we are not technically at war with Iran. The action was undertaken either under the auspices of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the War Powers Act that limits the scope of executive branch authority under Article II (the authority to declare war is granted to Congress Article I). But whatever one calls it, the first question should really be "what are its implications"?

Suleimani killing may have the intended effect of disrupting attacks on American targets, though no one is irreplaceable and if Iran decides to continue on its current course, his assassination may only serve to delay whatever it is being alleged was being planned (and "imminent"). The expected by-product is a ratcheting up of tension and the inevitable threat from Iran to retaliate (which elicited a predictably intemperate tweet from Donald Trump).  But there are divergences from the purported expectation in two directions; there are things that were expected that likely won't happen and there are those that weren't that will. 

It seems as though the administration has again failed to understand the way its actions would be seen abroad. It misjudged the reaction in Iran where throngs gathered to mourn the killing of one of their highest ranking government officials. While the Americans see Suleimani as a violent terrorist who supported and organized killings outside of Iran, as Trump himself has admitted, the CIA does much the same thing yet we don't consider its director a terrorist. Hence, there is considerable uncertainty as to Iran's response. While the administration hoped that Suleimani killing might have had a deterrent effect, the popular outrage in Iran puts its leaders in a bind. Their hands are now more tightly tied to a robust demonstration of retaliation in order to placate their domestic audience. The range of likely responses is now less predictable and arguably more troubling that those Iran has deployed in its foreign meddling to date. That in turn, given Trump's lack of impulse control and his need to appear tough to his base ahead of the election later this year, sets us on an upward spiral of escalating military action (including cyber) with no clear off-ramps.

The administration was also apparently unprepared, at least according to Mike Pompeo, for the lack of congratulatory high-fives from the Europeans. But since they weren't in on the surprise they were understandably underwhelmed; they might also, had they been forewarned, have advised against this course of action since they would have argued that it would have scuppered any hope of Iran adhering to the JCPOA, let alone coming back to the table to negotiate a more stringent (or at least a non-Obama) deal Trump appears to want.

That lack of understanding was also on full display (as was the lack of deliberation) when Trump tweeted that he would launch strikes against "cultural targets". Regardless or the fact that this is considered a war crime - Trump, in common with tin-pot dictators the world over, does not acknowledge legal jurisdiction to any supranational body, again the question should be what would such an action accomplish. It clearly would have no direct military significance; cultural artifacts are about as far as you can get from instruments or war. But it would clearly have a profound psychological impact, not only in Iran, but for all Shia Muslims in the region and potentially resonate around the world. America would clearly have ceded any moral high ground and provoked anti-America fervor in a large swath of the world's population, all of which makes         

And finally it's worth noting Pompeo's answer to Jake Tapper's question about the timing of the threat on which the attack was predicated. When asked whether this was days or weeks, Pompeo said "if you're and American in the region, days and weeks... this is not something that's relevant.” That is in essence an admission that the threat was not at all "imminent", and thus the use of force could not be justified under the AUMF. Congress therefore has every right argue that the attack should not have been carried out without Congressional approval.

Americans, by and large are more invested in strong individuals and leaders and faceless institutions, but that has led increasingly since 911 to the shifting of power from Congress to the Presidency. Trump is that best illustration to date of just how big a problem that is.

Qasem Suleimani: the Aftermath

Global GPS was particularly interesting this week, with three well informed, intelligent and articulate panel discussants: Megan O'Sullivan, Richard Haas and Peter Beinart. The contrast to the ignorant, visceral ranting on Fox and Friends was as sobering as it was stark (a context in which Lindsey Graham sounded almost statesmanlike)!

Megan O'Sullivan noted that the thinking behind Qasem Suleinani's assassination may have been to trigger regime change. She also expressed some scepticism as to the justification of an "imminent threat" given that usually information would by now have been made available to allies and to Congress; that it has not raises legitimate questions.

Richard Haas noted that the decision, rather than aiding regime change, appears to have accomplished the opposite, turning popular animosity in both Iran and Iraq away from their governments and directing it towards the United States.

And as Peter Beinart noted, it is noteworthy (thought in my view not in the least surprising; it appears to be a "feature" of the political right) that a politician who so depends on nationalist sentiment is unable to see how the interference by a foreign power, particularly one that is seen by many in the region as overbearing and mettlesome, would play badly in another country. Beinart also suggested that some in the administration would like to start a war with Iran as a means of destroying militarily it's bomb-making capability; John Bolton's name springs immediately to mind even though he is no longer employed there.

After the show aired this morning two significant developments unfolded in short order. First, Iran announced that it was abandoning the JCPOA. While it's recent transgressions were aimed at applying pressure to the allies to re-engage with the deal, it has evidently decided that this is no longer a viable alternative. It seems likely that it will now move as fast as it can to acquiring a nuclear weapon. The outcome will be that the region will have two nuclear powers, making it only the second after India and Pakistan to have two nuclear-armed adversaries (North Korea and China are not technically adversaries). That will be a problem for Israel, whose strategic options in defending itself are now more complicated and limited. The second development was the vote taken in the Iraqi parliament to expels US troops from the country, further reducing US influence in the region. Whether that puts the Homeland and Americans at greater risk is unclear, but it necessitates a shift in US regional policy.

A risky decision has produced a significant shift in the world order in a matter of hours. I suggested two days ago that the decision was high risk setting a damaging precedent and disrupting norms that have taken years to establish, norms which have made the world generally a safer place safer. I thought then that it might take some time to see the ramifications of that decision but it appears we are seeing clear signs much earlier than I anticipated.

Qasem Soleimani

The remains of a vehicle hit by missiles launched from a US drone outside the Baghdad airport.
Iraqi Prime Minister Press Office, via Associated Press

Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force and by all accounts the second most powerful person in Iran after the Supreme Leader, was killed yesterday by a US drone strike as he was being driven away from Baghdad airport. The Quds Force has been responsible for training and supporting Shia militias in the region and has been in important component in Iran's exercise of regional power. It seems not coincidental that he was arriving in Baghdad just as the demonstration that resulted in the storming of the US embassy was winding down.

US allies and Congress are both upset that such a significant decision was taken without consultation. The ramifications of Soleimani's killing may be enormous and are very hard to predict. Informal norms of international behavior suggest that while extrajudicial killings of foreign nationals are not unusual, what makes this so shocking is Soleimani's position. While low level operatives and civilian terrorists have been targeted in the past, it is unprecedented in modern times for a top government official to be targeted.

The implications are many; a precedent has been set that makes it 'acceptable' to target foreign leaders. Diplomacy is now off the table when it comes to the US' relations with Iran. Any chance of a new nuclear deal has been quashed. Iran may now accelerate its development of atomic power and weapons. Support for US policy in Iraq will decline and its role as a US regional partner has been severely diminished.  Americans in the region, both military and civilian, will be at much greater risk of coordinated and lone wolf retaliation.

Further afield, authoritarian regimes around the world will see this as a green light for the increased exercise of regional power though military action. Russia will be emboldened, putting Eastern Europe and the Baltic states at greater risk. China will expand its military activities in the South China Sea, further polarizing and already fracturing world order. Europe will face in increasingly difficult position between Russia on its Eastern doorstep and the US to the West, not to mention the China-US divide.

The decision to kill Qasem Soleimani will certainly change the course of history. It is too early to say whether this will be for the better. By upsetting generally accepted norms, significant decisions affecting the world order will now rely less on precedent and more on political power and calculus, making the future far less predictable.