If the US is not at war with Iran, then the extrajudicial killing of Suleimani is an assassination, that is the killing of a prominent persona, a senior government or a political figure in peace time. And since a declaration of war, an authority granted by the Constitution to Congress alone, has not been made, we are not technically at war with Iran. The action was undertaken either under the auspices of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the War Powers Act that limits the scope of executive branch authority under Article II (the authority to declare war is granted to Congress Article I). But whatever one calls it, the first question should really be "what are its implications"?
Suleimani killing may have the intended effect of disrupting attacks on American targets, though no one is irreplaceable and if Iran decides to continue on its current course, his assassination may only serve to delay whatever it is being alleged was being planned (and "imminent"). The expected by-product is a ratcheting up of tension and the inevitable threat from Iran to retaliate (which elicited a predictably intemperate tweet from Donald Trump). But there are divergences from the purported expectation in two directions; there are things that were expected that likely won't happen and there are those that weren't that will.
It seems as though the administration has again failed to understand the way its actions would be seen abroad. It misjudged the reaction in Iran where throngs gathered to mourn the killing of one of their highest ranking government officials. While the Americans see Suleimani as a violent terrorist who supported and organized killings outside of Iran, as Trump himself has admitted, the CIA does much the same thing yet we don't consider its director a terrorist. Hence, there is considerable uncertainty as to Iran's response. While the administration hoped that Suleimani killing might have had a deterrent effect, the popular outrage in Iran puts its leaders in a bind. Their hands are now more tightly tied to a robust demonstration of retaliation in order to placate their domestic audience. The range of likely responses is now less predictable and arguably more troubling that those Iran has deployed in its foreign meddling to date. That in turn, given Trump's lack of impulse control and his need to appear tough to his base ahead of the election later this year, sets us on an upward spiral of escalating military action (including cyber) with no clear off-ramps.
The administration was also apparently unprepared, at least according to Mike Pompeo, for the lack of congratulatory high-fives from the Europeans. But since they weren't in on the surprise they were understandably underwhelmed; they might also, had they been forewarned, have advised against this course of action since they would have argued that it would have scuppered any hope of Iran adhering to the JCPOA, let alone coming back to the table to negotiate a more stringent (or at least a non-Obama) deal Trump appears to want.
That lack of understanding was also on full display (as was the lack of deliberation) when Trump tweeted that he would launch strikes against "cultural targets". Regardless or the fact that this is considered a war crime - Trump, in common with tin-pot dictators the world over, does not acknowledge legal jurisdiction to any supranational body, again the question should be what would such an action accomplish. It clearly would have no direct military significance; cultural artifacts are about as far as you can get from instruments or war. But it would clearly have a profound psychological impact, not only in Iran, but for all Shia Muslims in the region and potentially resonate around the world. America would clearly have ceded any moral high ground and provoked anti-America fervor in a large swath of the world's population, all of which makes
And finally it's worth noting Pompeo's answer to Jake Tapper's question about the timing of the threat on which the attack was predicated. When asked whether this was days or weeks, Pompeo said "if you're and American in the region, days and weeks... this is not something that's relevant.” That is in essence an admission that the threat was not at all "imminent", and thus the use of force could not be justified under the AUMF. Congress therefore has every right argue that the attack should not have been carried out without Congressional approval.
Americans, by and large are more invested in strong individuals and leaders and faceless institutions, but that has led increasingly since 911 to the shifting of power from Congress to the Presidency. Trump is that best illustration to date of just how big a problem that is.
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