Sigma's stretegic debacle

In 2009 Sigma, a lens maker turned camera manufacturer, announced a new flagship camera, the SD1. Rumours about pricing - emanating from interviews with its marketing executives - suggested a price tag of about $2,000. Given it's touted 45MP sensor, this was highly attractive to the top end of the mass market - the 'prosumers'.

When the company did finally announce pricing in May 2011, it had clearly taken a decision to abandon the mass market and position the camera as an alternative to existing medium format digital offerings from companies such as  Hasselblad and Mamiya. This was a huge gamble; it meant persuading professional photographers to accept a relatively under-featured DSLR body and to buy the notion that the Foveon 15MP sensor was indeed equivalent to their Phase 1 and Leaf digital backs. The Faveon vs. Bayer debate persists to this day and this was never going to be an easy sell. Moreover, with an MSRP of $9,700 without a lens, Sigma had put the camera squarely outside the reach of the non-professional market, thereby discarding any economies of scale in manufacturing. In a stunning reversal this week, Sigma announced that it will start selling the camera, rebranded the SD1-Merrill, for around $2,300.

Strategically the launch of the SD1 has been a disaster. Originally unveiled September 2010, the SD1 was 6 months late to market. Then admitting, just 7 months after it was available for purchase, that the $9,700 price point was artificially high -- the entry level medium format Mamiya 645-AFD sells for about the same price -- signals to professional that the cost of the camera was nowhere near what one might expect from a piece of professional equipment. Whether Mamiya's costs are comparable isn't the point; the dramatic price reduction suggests that at $9,700 buyers were being gouged.

The initial pricing decision and subsequent reversal also infuriated high-end buyers in the non-professional market. Many delayed making a camera purchase while Sigma, historically slow bringing products to market after announcing them, kept them waiting with the temptation of a high-end camera at a fairly low (~$2,000) price. When it was announced at almost 5 times that, consumers were disappointed and annoyed at having waited for nothing.

Reversing that decision only makes matters worse. First, the pent-up demand the original announcement generated has now been met in other ways and with other products. For example I have invested in a medium format film camera and a high quality scanner instead. Others will have chosen Canon's T3i, an 18MP camera, or Sony's Alpha 77 at 24MP. Both come from manufacturers with a far stronger and long established reputations in camera manufacturing. And now, for any of those who went this route as a 'second best', the this week's announcement is doubly galling. Not to mention the ire that anyone who bought the SD1 at $10k must now be feeling. Admittedly, both B&H and Adorama have been discounting the camera to $6,900; but nevertheless, paying nearly $7k in June for a camera that 7 months later will sell for just $2.2k can't help but leave a bad taste.  Sigma's offer of 'points', presumably redeemable only against other Sigma products, to those who over-paid is derisory.

With Kazuto Yamaki, Sigma is now under new stewardship. Whether he can save the company's camera division from extinction is debatable. The company had a lot of goodwill as the only manufacturer willing to back the Foveon sensor. Buyers put up with under-speced cameras to have access to Faveon technology; Sigma was Faveon's sole licensee and later acquired the sensor company. But things have moved on since the revolutionary sensor was announced a decade ago. Beyer sensors have come a long way; high volumes and bruising competition have led to improvements in quality and manufacturing cost. With no competence in camera making, Sigma was staking everything on its reputation in lenses and the Faveon sensor. Since Canon, Nikon and Olympus all have a long history and a strong reputation in lenses, and other competitors such as Sony and Panasonic have teamed up with firms who have competences in optics, Sigma's only real competitive advantage was in the sensor which it bought when it acquired Faveon. This is unlikely to be sufficient to outweigh its deficiencies in camera design, development and manufacturing. Expect to see Sigma exit the camera market (though not lenses) in a year to 18 months.

Does this mean that Faveon's technology is dead or are there other options for Faveon fans? For example could Sigma sell Faveon to another camera company? This seems possible but unlikely. It can't sell Faveon to the majors (Nikon or Canon) who have their own sensors and have been on the other side of the debate about pixels and photosites. Sony wouldn't be interested since it too has developed its own high resolution APC and full frame sensors. Kodak perhaps? They to have their own sensors (and they're broke and lack a viable business model).

Olympus, however, might. The company seems to be struggling to find its way; its products in the point-and-shoot market rely more on software than optics and build quality. The E-1/3/5 hasn't really generated much excitement not gained much traction among professionals other than a loyal fan base (much like Apple 15 years ago). The OM-D (pictured right) with a Faveon sensor? That I might buy.