The third Iraq war

I.S.I.L. fighters have taken control of Mosul and Tikrit. Hawks in the US are insisting that Iraq is of vital national security interest and something be done. As usual they are short on particulars other than that whatever the President did, or is thinking of doing is wrong. They haven't explained what the vital national security interest is; crude oil and the fear of creating a failed state and a breeding ground for terrorism, possibly? (More concerning is the possibility that Iran's reach will extend further in the region).

The President this morning pointed out quite rightly that without the political will on the part of the Shiites to teat the Sunnis more inclusively than they have since Saddam Husein's regime was toppled, military intervention would, in the longer run, accomplish nothing, just as it didn't a decade ago. No one can seriously think it a good idea to put troops back into a what has become sectarian blood bath; first would they be committed for another decade or more (which we cannot afford - but of course the hawks who didn't pay for the last war are conspicuously quiet as to who will pay for the next one - Dick Cheney promised that the Iraqis would pay the bill but that didn't work out so well last time around). 

Military intervention, absent a political solution, would not just be costly and pointless; it would likely be counter productive. It would refocus the perception of the Great Satan across the Middle East, giving extremists more reason to turn their murderous attentions towards the US rather than each other.

Too much has probably been made of I.S.I.L.'s effectiveness. It was helped in no small measure by the anti Shiite sentiment in towns that are predominantly Suni, who have borne the brunt of the exclusionary policies of the Malicki government, which is what makes a political settlement crucial.  If the US steps in again and bolsters the Malicki regime it will not only harden Sunni extremists' views of the US as the meddling enemy, but will create an incentive for Malicki to continue to avoid the hard choices that political compromise with the Sunnis requires. In other words, intervention creates a moral hazard problem; until Malicki realizes that he has to negotiate seriously with the Sunnis the conflict and the violence will not go away.

The hawks are as ever swift to reach for the gun - but fail to clarify precisely what they hope to accomplish, what their goals are, or to answer the "Then what?" question.