"Surprize, surprize, surprize..." !

Alexander Khudoteply/AFP/Getty Image

Russian troops have now unambiguously begun their country's invasion of Ukraine. The Obama's administration has been, regrettably, predictable but in this instance ill-thought out. It's goal of disentangling the US from the ill conceived democracy-building initiatives of the Bush era in Iraq and Afghanistan, while sensible in that context, make little sense in Eastern Europe.

Congress' inability to compromise on a budget in 2011 which has led to sequestration, has required cuts in military spending, and while much less drastic than those proposed by then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and George H.W. Bush in 1990 in 1990, do send a signal that the US is more reluctant that it has been in the last quarter century to intervene militarily.

The administration's response has been bluster and no visible action. That action need not be military; but to make brash public statements and then not follow through (as for example with the red-line and chemical weapons in Syria) has created the same dynamic between Obama and Putin as existed between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962. And a strategy as ingenious and robust as Kennedy's is needed now. Instead of speaking softly and carrying a big stick, Obama has been speaking loudly (and publicly) but carrying no stick.

From Putin's perspective, a West-leaning government in Ukraine jeopardizes Russia's strategic interests, given importance of the naval base in Sabastipol and Russia's access to the black Sea and the Mediterranean. Given too, the similarly corrupt nature of the old Ukrainian regime to Russia's plutocracy, it also represents a democratic challenge to the Russian political status quo. Since Putin has relied increasingly on 20th century style approached to the suppression of dissent internally, a democratic putsch in Ukraine encourages domestic dissent that imperils his position at home. So this was never going to end well, that is to say with a diplomatic solution not backed by unpleasant or costly outcomes for Putin and for Russia. Russia's economy may be in bad shape (and Ukraine's in worse) but Europe gets 60% of it's gas from Russia. So Putin thinks he holds test strongest cards; America is war-weary and (traditionally) disinterested in Europe, and Europe is disorganized and held hostage to Russia's gas.

Europe's response
Europe's collective response to developments in the region has been astonishing. Given its proximity and history, a much more robust stance and greater preparedness would have been needed to prevent the situation from reaching its current juncture.

Ironically, the EU as an institution has made a coordinated European response harder; individual nation states in different and contextually appropriately configured alliances would have acted faster and more decisively than the EU as a whole will ever be able to. On March 2, the day after Russian troops invaded, the top story on the EU's website was "Gender Pay Gap stagnates at 16.4% across Europe". The top stories featured on the European Parliament's website were: 'Getting the economy back on track', 'Syria'. 'Air Passenger Rights', 'Data Protection' and 'Quality of life: the vital ingredient'. It was as if nothing in the least bit out of the ordinary was going on.

Europe's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Evangelos Venizelos began his statement on returning from the Ukraine, March 2nd, with this absurd comment: "The meeting gave me the opportunity to better understand the situation and to convey the Greek message as well as the European message." "I made special mention of the Greek community of Mariupol and of the wider region in general, and I am pleased that the transitional Ukrainian government is prepared to deal with these issues." (There are only 92,548 ethnic Greeks in Ukraine, less than 0.2% of the population, according to a 2001 census).

What Now?
Given the likelihood that many Russian government officials and politicians have profited handsomely since the fall of Communism, freezing overseas bank assets would certainly hurt. That would be a start. International recognition of the new Ukrainian government would probably help too. Whether the EU (or the US) want's to get into a bidding war to bail out a country whose economy, by current estimates, needs an injection of $25b is far from clear. Germany's reluctance to foot other peoples' bills, seen clearly in the case of Greece, makes it doubtful that any money will be made available in the next few weeks or even months. The IMF will want to attach financial strings and conditions, arguable harder to fulfill than the political strings Russia attached to its $15b offer of last year.

From here, where?
Crimea will return to Russia; that's already a fait accompli. The only question is whether Russia will invade Ukraine, as it did in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968); and all signs are that absent a more robust response from the US and Europe, that it will. Perhaps the most optimistic scenario is that Ukraine will split along ethnic and religious lines with Ukrainians in one state and Russians in another. A more pessimistic one is that Russia invades the entire country and installs a puppet regime, tightly linked, as during the Cold War, to Russia. Events are moving quickly, much faster than Europe or the US appears able to keep up with. Russia has the initiative and we have been caught napping without an appropriate policy response.