The Future of Ukraine

Tom Friedman, a journalist for whom I have great respect suggested it was far too early to make predictions about the future of Ukraine. He's probably right, but I have less to lose than he in speculating.

First, an update; Putin, in a speech this morning, has vowed not to invade Ukraine proper. Whether this is a tactical move to take the wind out of the sails of the increasingly upset Europeans or whether it is a real commitment is unclear; my money's on the former. He'll let the Europeans think they won a small reprieve (but no rolling back; Crimea will henceforth remain Russian) so that they turn their attention elsewhere.

 The future turns on what happens in Ukraine. If it succeeds in establishing a passably working democratic government, Putin may be content to leave well alone. He has secured the navy's access to the Black Sea, has boosted his popularity at home, and among the Russiophiles in the Crimea. If it fails, unrest may well follow, and Putin may once again feel 'obligated' to look after those being oppressed in a neighboring country; and Russia will invade and annex Ukraine in its entirety. And if it succeeds, and with help from Europe, then it's hard to say what he will do; success would threaten the Russian political and economic model and potentially fuel unrest at home. But he may not be willing to invade a country that is thriving politically and economically without the pretext of saving people from corrupt and thuggish governments; to do so would expose him to more robust international political pressure than he has been so far.

But my guess is that Ukraine may well fail in its bid to Westernize. Since its independence, it has tried two different political parties, both of which by all accounts were corrupt and incompetent. There is little to suggest that the new administration, however well intentioned, will be much different. What is missing are the robust institutions needed to provide constraints on the excesses of elected politicians; that may sound counter intuitive, but a strong (and honest) civil service helps prevent elected politicians from taking first steps on the slippery slope from responsiveness to voters, to pandering to powerful interests to outright corruption.

David Sanger noted that in relying heavily on sanctions, Obama is "playing a long game". But it may be so long that neither he nor Putin will be in office by the time they begin have an effect on policy. Sanger also suggested that Obama is trying to reverse the policy of closer economic integration with Russia. The argument, and extension of that used after the Second World War was the countries whose economies are intertwined won't go to war with one another. While it may have worked in Europe for 70 years, it is a policy that doesn't apply to Russia, largely because of the concentration of wealth. When war between economically coupled countries means everyone suffers, that acts as a deterrent. When wealth is concentrated, the majority have little to lose and the elites have enough not to worry; so economic integration is no longer such an effective brake on military aggression. That's why Obama's bid to isolate Russia economically makes sense.