With the failure of the Democrat's effort to remove Trump from office, his election in November is all but assured. And on the day that the UK leaves the EU, that has consequences for Britain.
Today, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland -- united perhaps only until Scotland holds another referendum on secession -- leaves the EU and begins the task of renegotiating access to European markets and simultaneously finding new trading partners.
Boris Johnson's hope that Trump will come through for Britain is entirely misplaced; as alike as they are in many ways, if one thing is clear it's that Trump is will use all the leverage at his disposal to benefit America and his friends.
In particular, since he'd like money from pharmaceutical companies to help in his reelection, and they want to be able to sell product without facing a monopsony, he will condition any trade deal with Britain on a relaxation of the NHS bargaining over prices for drugs. While that won't put Britain into the same category as the US in terms of overpaying for health care, it will put additional strain on the NHS budget. And since Johnson won't raise taxes to make up for the increase in costs, and the bonanza from EU withdrawal is very likely "creative accounting", the services the NHS provides will suffer.
Friday, January 31, 2020
Impeachment #7.1 - What next
As of 11am today (January 31st, 2020) it appears as though the the Senate will vote not to hear additional testimony or subpoena and consider any additional evidence. Among Republicans, there seem to be two camps; those who see nothing wrong with Trump's actions, and those who think it wrong but not sufficient to warrant removal from office. Since it is thus very unlikely that Trump will be convicted in the Senate, the question arises; what next?
No doubt Trump will declare victory (indeed, he prevailed in his case) and try to leverage that into campaign contributions and votes. It is also likely that he will now actively exploit the precedent that has been set, that in effect he is untouchable. The free pass that Congress has in essence afforded him opens the door for no end of abuse of office in the run up to the 2020 election. This has to be the Democrats' worst nightmare; a rogue chief executive with no constraints at all.
And while the House might continue to pursue its investigations, its hope that using the impeachment process to pry open the White House cone of silence is dashed. Its only remedy is through the courts, and the relatively slow pace at which arguments will move through the judicial system make this evenue moot for the November election.
While it has been largely understood that the impeachment process was never going to result in Trump's removal from office, and was therefore principally about shining a spotlight on his conduct, that effort has largely failed. At the same time it has given Trump licence to reoffend and since jeopardy would seem to be attached, so no further action, at least on this case, can be brought.
The Democrat's lack of appreciation of the effectiveness of their opponent's ruthless disregard of political norms could also play out in their selection of their candidate for the presidential election. The mood in much of the country is not one of sitting and listening to carefully constructed arguments about this or that policy. Much of the country seems depressed, distrustful of policy wonks and political elites, and just wants a larger than life "hero" figure. With his "America First" MAGA doctrine, Trump provides just that. No hard to grasp nuanced argument, just chest-thumping, feel good rhetoric. Then we can get on with our daily lives.
In hindsight the Dem's decision to impeach Trump may be seen as a stunning defeat and a terrible error of judgement, since it all but guarantees Trump's reelection. More worryingly, it has set an appalling precedent that significantly weakens Congress' ability to act as a check on the authority of the Executive branch. Absent legislation or an amendment to the Constitution, the Executive branch has been gifted vastly more autonomy. Whatever happens next, historians will rightly look back at 2019 as a watershed year in American democracy.
No doubt Trump will declare victory (indeed, he prevailed in his case) and try to leverage that into campaign contributions and votes. It is also likely that he will now actively exploit the precedent that has been set, that in effect he is untouchable. The free pass that Congress has in essence afforded him opens the door for no end of abuse of office in the run up to the 2020 election. This has to be the Democrats' worst nightmare; a rogue chief executive with no constraints at all.
And while the House might continue to pursue its investigations, its hope that using the impeachment process to pry open the White House cone of silence is dashed. Its only remedy is through the courts, and the relatively slow pace at which arguments will move through the judicial system make this evenue moot for the November election.
While it has been largely understood that the impeachment process was never going to result in Trump's removal from office, and was therefore principally about shining a spotlight on his conduct, that effort has largely failed. At the same time it has given Trump licence to reoffend and since jeopardy would seem to be attached, so no further action, at least on this case, can be brought.
The Democrat's lack of appreciation of the effectiveness of their opponent's ruthless disregard of political norms could also play out in their selection of their candidate for the presidential election. The mood in much of the country is not one of sitting and listening to carefully constructed arguments about this or that policy. Much of the country seems depressed, distrustful of policy wonks and political elites, and just wants a larger than life "hero" figure. With his "America First" MAGA doctrine, Trump provides just that. No hard to grasp nuanced argument, just chest-thumping, feel good rhetoric. Then we can get on with our daily lives.
In hindsight the Dem's decision to impeach Trump may be seen as a stunning defeat and a terrible error of judgement, since it all but guarantees Trump's reelection. More worryingly, it has set an appalling precedent that significantly weakens Congress' ability to act as a check on the authority of the Executive branch. Absent legislation or an amendment to the Constitution, the Executive branch has been gifted vastly more autonomy. Whatever happens next, historians will rightly look back at 2019 as a watershed year in American democracy.
Impeachment #7
The case for removing Donald Trump from office, whatever one's feelings about is fitness for office, is not cut and dried.
What seems generally accepted is that Trump used the power of his office to pressure a foreign government to provide dirt on a political opponent and then sought to prevent Congress from looking into what he had done.
One interpretation, that advanced by the House Managers, raises three issues; that Trump abused the power of the office by using it for personal gain, that he was inviting foreign meddling in a US election, and by stonewalling Congressional requests for information and testimony, he was obstructing Congress which has the right (and the duty) to hold the executive branch to account.
However, there are reasons to suggest that impeachment and a verdict of removal from office would be inappropriate.
First, with respect to Article 1, there is the central question of motive. If asking for an investigation into Joe and Hunter Biden was in part motivated by a desire to deal with corruption, then the act, even though it had as a 'side-effect' of benefitting Trump in the upcoming election, might not qualify as an abuse of power. If it cannot be definitively ruled out that an element of Trump's intent to further the rooting out of corruption, something that would be (and has been) a legitimate US foreign policy goal, his conditioning official acts on Zolensky opening of an investigation could be seen as a legitimate exercise of the power of the office. Thus the first article, abuse of office, cannot be definitively proven. While the most probable interpretation of Trump's actions is that it was solely about political gain and not corruption in general, it is unclear that this can be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, with or without the testimony of Bolton, Mulveny, and Pompeo and others who might provide corroboration. Proving intent here is difficult.
Second, with respect to Article 2, it has been argued that in the absence of a case for the first article, the second is moot; if there was no offense, there could be no cover-up, even if the scope of the refusal to cooperate with Congress want far beyond historical precedent and the normal exercise of executive privilege. The problem with this argument is that the determination of whether there was an offense or not cannot be left to the defendant, the Executive branch in this case, but must be made by the prosecution, the House.
Perhaps a better defense is that Congress' right to demand information from the Executive branch has not been fully tested in court. While the Supreme Court ruling on the Nixon tapes suggests that the Executive's prerogative to withhold information from Congress is not without exception, the limits of what must be divulged and what may be withheld may still be subject to debate and adjudication. And since the House did not pursue its request through the judicial branch, the case for obstruction can't be made since it is not clear that the House has an indisputable right to the information it sought.
While utterly farcical, Alan Dershowitz' argument that if the president believes his reelection is in the "public interest" then any action he takes in pursuit of that end is is, by definition, in the public interest and therefore not impeachable could be applied to both articles. The original abuse of power was intended to help Trump get reelected, and the exposure of this act would have damaged his reelection chances, so covering it up was also material to his reelection. Thus both articles are nullified according to the Dershowitz doctrine. The Dershowitz theory, fortunately, is unlikely to survive the test of time, public opinion or the courts.
So while to many the preponderance of circumstantial evidence points to Trump's guilt on both counts, it is perhaps not incontrovertible; and if not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then perhaps removal from office is not an appropriate remedy.
The case for impeachment is not cut and dried, but US democracy is left torn and tacky.
What seems generally accepted is that Trump used the power of his office to pressure a foreign government to provide dirt on a political opponent and then sought to prevent Congress from looking into what he had done.
One interpretation, that advanced by the House Managers, raises three issues; that Trump abused the power of the office by using it for personal gain, that he was inviting foreign meddling in a US election, and by stonewalling Congressional requests for information and testimony, he was obstructing Congress which has the right (and the duty) to hold the executive branch to account.
However, there are reasons to suggest that impeachment and a verdict of removal from office would be inappropriate.
First, with respect to Article 1, there is the central question of motive. If asking for an investigation into Joe and Hunter Biden was in part motivated by a desire to deal with corruption, then the act, even though it had as a 'side-effect' of benefitting Trump in the upcoming election, might not qualify as an abuse of power. If it cannot be definitively ruled out that an element of Trump's intent to further the rooting out of corruption, something that would be (and has been) a legitimate US foreign policy goal, his conditioning official acts on Zolensky opening of an investigation could be seen as a legitimate exercise of the power of the office. Thus the first article, abuse of office, cannot be definitively proven. While the most probable interpretation of Trump's actions is that it was solely about political gain and not corruption in general, it is unclear that this can be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, with or without the testimony of Bolton, Mulveny, and Pompeo and others who might provide corroboration. Proving intent here is difficult.
Second, with respect to Article 2, it has been argued that in the absence of a case for the first article, the second is moot; if there was no offense, there could be no cover-up, even if the scope of the refusal to cooperate with Congress want far beyond historical precedent and the normal exercise of executive privilege. The problem with this argument is that the determination of whether there was an offense or not cannot be left to the defendant, the Executive branch in this case, but must be made by the prosecution, the House.
Perhaps a better defense is that Congress' right to demand information from the Executive branch has not been fully tested in court. While the Supreme Court ruling on the Nixon tapes suggests that the Executive's prerogative to withhold information from Congress is not without exception, the limits of what must be divulged and what may be withheld may still be subject to debate and adjudication. And since the House did not pursue its request through the judicial branch, the case for obstruction can't be made since it is not clear that the House has an indisputable right to the information it sought.
While utterly farcical, Alan Dershowitz' argument that if the president believes his reelection is in the "public interest" then any action he takes in pursuit of that end is is, by definition, in the public interest and therefore not impeachable could be applied to both articles. The original abuse of power was intended to help Trump get reelected, and the exposure of this act would have damaged his reelection chances, so covering it up was also material to his reelection. Thus both articles are nullified according to the Dershowitz doctrine. The Dershowitz theory, fortunately, is unlikely to survive the test of time, public opinion or the courts.
So while to many the preponderance of circumstantial evidence points to Trump's guilt on both counts, it is perhaps not incontrovertible; and if not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then perhaps removal from office is not an appropriate remedy.
The case for impeachment is not cut and dried, but US democracy is left torn and tacky.
Wednesday, January 29, 2020
Presidential power according to Dershowitz
"If the president does something which he believes will help him get elected, in the public interest, that cannot be the kind of quid pro quo that results in impeachment". Alan Dershowitz, Jan 29 2020.
So, hypothetically, if a president requested a foreign power to 'detain indefinitely' a political rival, in return for say government aid and believed that his (re) election was in the national interest that would be an acceptable quid pro quo?
But Dershowitz doesn't qualify this as limited to a foreign power. He might ask the his Attorney General to open an investigation into a rival candidate in return for a promise of another job, perhaps at State, or as a director of one of his companies; that too would be an OK quid pro quo?
Or perhaps, he could offer local returning officers a position in his cabinet if they stuffed the ballot boxes in the elections they are charged with overseeing?
Because, let's face it, no candidate running for office is ever going to think that their getting elected is NOT in the public interest; if they did -- and had any integrity-- they wouldn't be running.
Dershowitz appears not to see much further than the glare of the spotlight he appears to so enjoy. Is this really the kind of "intellect" the Harvard Law School wants to associate itself with?
So, hypothetically, if a president requested a foreign power to 'detain indefinitely' a political rival, in return for say government aid and believed that his (re) election was in the national interest that would be an acceptable quid pro quo?
But Dershowitz doesn't qualify this as limited to a foreign power. He might ask the his Attorney General to open an investigation into a rival candidate in return for a promise of another job, perhaps at State, or as a director of one of his companies; that too would be an OK quid pro quo?
Or perhaps, he could offer local returning officers a position in his cabinet if they stuffed the ballot boxes in the elections they are charged with overseeing?
Because, let's face it, no candidate running for office is ever going to think that their getting elected is NOT in the public interest; if they did -- and had any integrity-- they wouldn't be running.
Dershowitz appears not to see much further than the glare of the spotlight he appears to so enjoy. Is this really the kind of "intellect" the Harvard Law School wants to associate itself with?
A Flawed Deal
The "Deal of the Century" as Trump, with uncharacteristic humility, is calling Jared's plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is dommed; but that may not be unintentional. Like so much of Trump's initiatives it's more about the sizzle and less about the steak, how it plays on TV rather than what it might actually accomplish.
At least as being reported, the plan legitimizes the settlements Israel built in the West Bank; it does not guarantee right of return; it does not halt but only temporarily freezes further annexation of disputed land in the West Bank and Israel may well continue to expand its settlements. And in return there is a promise, unlikely to be kept, for $50 billion to support the new quasi-independent State of Palestine.
The plan reflects Kushner's inexperience and naivety; offering a deal that is in essence a very large bribe is not a viable solution to three generations of killing and hatred, as anyone from Northern Ireland could have told him. Second, he appears not to have learned anything from the US' nation-building debacle in Iraq (or for the matter in post cold war Russia). The institutions of a well functioning society cannot be created out of thin air. Their efficacy depends on trust, which takes years to build (and much less time to erode as his father-in-law is so deftly demonstrating).
However given international reaction, particularly in the Arab world, this is likely to be the end of any serious support for Palestinian statehood. The world, it seems, has grown tired of 70 years of conflict and now simply wants to turn away and move on.
What that means for the stability of the region is an open question; my worst case scenario prediction is that the region will unfold as another ugly Syria-esque situation. The Palestinians will refuse the deal, violence will increase, Israel will do much as Bashar Al Assad did and create a refugee crisis as it annexes the Gaza strip and the West Bank; and the world, increasingly nationalistic and inwardly focused, will eventually come to terms with the de facto reality on the ground.
At least as being reported, the plan legitimizes the settlements Israel built in the West Bank; it does not guarantee right of return; it does not halt but only temporarily freezes further annexation of disputed land in the West Bank and Israel may well continue to expand its settlements. And in return there is a promise, unlikely to be kept, for $50 billion to support the new quasi-independent State of Palestine.
The plan reflects Kushner's inexperience and naivety; offering a deal that is in essence a very large bribe is not a viable solution to three generations of killing and hatred, as anyone from Northern Ireland could have told him. Second, he appears not to have learned anything from the US' nation-building debacle in Iraq (or for the matter in post cold war Russia). The institutions of a well functioning society cannot be created out of thin air. Their efficacy depends on trust, which takes years to build (and much less time to erode as his father-in-law is so deftly demonstrating).
However given international reaction, particularly in the Arab world, this is likely to be the end of any serious support for Palestinian statehood. The world, it seems, has grown tired of 70 years of conflict and now simply wants to turn away and move on.
What that means for the stability of the region is an open question; my worst case scenario prediction is that the region will unfold as another ugly Syria-esque situation. The Palestinians will refuse the deal, violence will increase, Israel will do much as Bashar Al Assad did and create a refugee crisis as it annexes the Gaza strip and the West Bank; and the world, increasingly nationalistic and inwardly focused, will eventually come to terms with the de facto reality on the ground.
Friday, January 17, 2020
House managers and unscrupulous lawyers
The team of House Managers the Dems have put together to conduct the prosecution of the impeachment case against Donald J. Trump comprise some very experienced legislators. They are up against two very wiley and unscrupulous lawyers (Kenneth Starr, Alan Dershowitz).
The outcome was always certain from outset, but Trump's legal team is going to crush the Dems in the PR battle too.
Expect a second MAGA term.
The outcome was always certain from outset, but Trump's legal team is going to crush the Dems in the PR battle too.
Expect a second MAGA term.
Priorities
"They won a championship while cheating!" proclaimed an outraged Fox on air talent, about something having to do with baseball?
Interesting! Trump won an election while trying to cheat (whether his efforts were directly responsible for Russian intervention is unclear) and has been actively cheating in the run up to the 2020 election (trying to extort Ukraine to provide political dirt on his political rival using the power of his office).
Who wins at baseball is clearly more important than who runs the country. The Fox broadcaster argued that the "championship be revoked". Pity we can't to that for the election Trump tried to rig.
Interesting! Trump won an election while trying to cheat (whether his efforts were directly responsible for Russian intervention is unclear) and has been actively cheating in the run up to the 2020 election (trying to extort Ukraine to provide political dirt on his political rival using the power of his office).
Who wins at baseball is clearly more important than who runs the country. The Fox broadcaster argued that the "championship be revoked". Pity we can't to that for the election Trump tried to rig.
Wednesday, January 15, 2020
Risky Business
Nancy Pelosi is taking a huge risk pushing for witnesses in the upcoming impeachment trial of Donald Trump. The argument Jerry Nadler, one of the House Managers who will be conducting the prosecution made, was that witness are important but should only be called if they are relevant. He suggested that witnesses with first hand knowledge of Trump's efforts to pressure Ukraine to deliver dirt on Hunter Biden is a violation of the constitution because it uses the office of the president for non-official (political) business (akin to making long distance personal calls on the company phone).
But his argument is flawed; the administration's defense is that Trump was not digging for dirt but looking for evidence in rooting out corruption, making his actions consistent with the aims of the country and something that the occupant of the White House might reasonably be expected to do as part of his official duties.
Hunter Biden is germain here because his links to his father look like corruption, at least as more broadly defined than by the Supreme Court. If the administration argues convincingly that Hunter Biden is party to corruption, not only does it help exonerate the President, but it makes his inevitable acquittal look justified and the Democrats look as though they are defending a corrupt system, thereby hurting Joe Biden's election chances. That makes Pelosi's gamble look not only very high stakes, but improves the odds of Trump being re-elected. The GOP clearly won this round.
But his argument is flawed; the administration's defense is that Trump was not digging for dirt but looking for evidence in rooting out corruption, making his actions consistent with the aims of the country and something that the occupant of the White House might reasonably be expected to do as part of his official duties.
Hunter Biden is germain here because his links to his father look like corruption, at least as more broadly defined than by the Supreme Court. If the administration argues convincingly that Hunter Biden is party to corruption, not only does it help exonerate the President, but it makes his inevitable acquittal look justified and the Democrats look as though they are defending a corrupt system, thereby hurting Joe Biden's election chances. That makes Pelosi's gamble look not only very high stakes, but improves the odds of Trump being re-elected. The GOP clearly won this round.
Friday, January 10, 2020
David Brooks on hyperventilation: a Reply
David Books, whose analysis on The PBS News Hour I watch religiously and deeply appreciate wrote an article in yesterday's NYT suggesting that Trump is bringing us all down to his level and that his detractors are making counter arguments in similarly over-hyped and simplistic terms. As evidence he cited Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren's concerned about the possibility of going to war with Iran. While I agree that Donald Trump (and his boosters on Fox) tend to frame things in stupifyingly simplistic terms, I disagree that one should not have been very concerned by recent events.
First, the killing of a high profile Iranian military leader and political figure came with enormous risk, in part because there was little precedent to guide our understanding of Iran’s response. Second, Trump's public statements, and the comments made by those who have worked with him suggest, as Books noted, an impulsive generally uninformed decision making process. Third, it is unclear that Trump is consistent in his choices, appearing to go with the whim of the moment, or the choice that seems to appeal most to his base; just because he has said in the past he doesn’t want war does not preclude him embracing it in the future. Finally, it has been suggested that extreme and unexpected choices are particularly appealing to him. All of which suggests that as terrible a choice as going to war with Iran would likely be for the US and the region, it was not unthinkable that he would chose this course. Indeed, the somber tone of the Fox and Friends and Fox News anchors yesterday seems to indicate that they considered this a distinct possibility. So I do think we had cause for concern.
First, the killing of a high profile Iranian military leader and political figure came with enormous risk, in part because there was little precedent to guide our understanding of Iran’s response. Second, Trump's public statements, and the comments made by those who have worked with him suggest, as Books noted, an impulsive generally uninformed decision making process. Third, it is unclear that Trump is consistent in his choices, appearing to go with the whim of the moment, or the choice that seems to appeal most to his base; just because he has said in the past he doesn’t want war does not preclude him embracing it in the future. Finally, it has been suggested that extreme and unexpected choices are particularly appealing to him. All of which suggests that as terrible a choice as going to war with Iran would likely be for the US and the region, it was not unthinkable that he would chose this course. Indeed, the somber tone of the Fox and Friends and Fox News anchors yesterday seems to indicate that they considered this a distinct possibility. So I do think we had cause for concern.
Thursday, January 9, 2020
End of the road
In 1989 I bought my first personal computer, an IBM PS/2 for I think around £2,300. Stupid money, certainly but at the time I thought I'd go on from the MBA to a high paying job (little did I know). That machine in some ways altered my life subtly but profoundly. But that's another story. This is about my journey with Microsoft "killed apps".
The first useful software I installed was Windows 3.1 and Harvard Graphics. Lotus 123 for DOS was also on that machine (and OS/2 was for a while too). I know I ran DOS Word 5.0 and World 2.0 for Windows on it.
I had three Mac laptops at work but the Microsoft implementation of Office on the Mac was never really satisfactory. For a long time it had no visual basic macros.
I had a copy of Office 2007 running in Windows under VM which was the most reliable means of getting Office functionality in Linux at the time (and arguably sill is) .
The enhancements, which in the early days from one version to the next were dramatic, have become increasingly marginal to the point where from a functional standpoint I can't tell the difference between 2013 and 2016. Although keeping up with the latest version has been hampered by running Linux, I am still happily running software that is a decade old.
Today I downloaded a copy of Office 2016 for my home desktop (my work laptop I think has it installed but actually I'm not sure without looking which version I'm running on it). That's when I realized that it is probably the last desktop version of Office I will buy. For 30 years I've been eagerly (though recently less so) waiting to see what the next version brings, but now that journey is over. At least for the killer apps, I have reached the end of the road.
Wednesday, January 8, 2020
Asymmetric Warfare
Iran's carefully calibrated retaliation for the killing of Qasem Suleimani shows how astute Iran's leadership is. The missile strike allowed it to appease an already angry domestic audience, to demonstrate its improved technological capabilities, all without killing or even injuring any Americans which would have made US retaliation inevitable. That was needle very carefully threaded. The contrast with the White House is stark and illustrates another sense in which Iran and the US are in an asymmetric struggle; the US has the stronger military, but Iran clearly has the smarter leader.
Partisanship is divided along party lines
That the self-love and other-loathing is a predominantly Republican phenomenon is disturbing; one party, the GOP, believes that its political opponents really are "the other" while the other party (the Dems) see people as Americans. The GOP, adroitly aided and abetted by Fox and AM talk radio, through their interminable vitriol-filled pejorative rhetoric, are largely responsible for creating this division. Years of using fear and loathing of "the other" by the GOP for its own political ends has brought us to this point: that strikes me as supremely unpatriotic.
The Sound of Silence
With the US and Iran on the brink of war, what has been striking over the last 48 hours is the conspicuous silence of world leaders. One explanation, given that I write this from within the USA, is that the US media's focus on Trump and Iran blocks out everything else. But looking at the press' response in Europe the silence is deafening.
Le Monde on its website today has no coverage of Trump's address at all. The Frankfurter Allgemeine notes Germany's foreign minister condemning the Iranian missile strike but calling for de-escalation; no comment from Angela Merkel. Britain's Foreign Secretary made a similar statement yesterday, but the Guardian and the Telegraph both focused on the Prime Minister's difficulties with getting Brexit done. One can only assume that there was either tacit or explicit agreement amongst the allies that any public comments suggesting de-escalation would be counterproductive, given Trump's strained relations with European leaders, and that private communications would be more effective. They seem to have concluded that allowing Trump to take the limelight and the credit for stating the obvious is an important prerequisite to achieving their international policy goals.
Le Monde on its website today has no coverage of Trump's address at all. The Frankfurter Allgemeine notes Germany's foreign minister condemning the Iranian missile strike but calling for de-escalation; no comment from Angela Merkel. Britain's Foreign Secretary made a similar statement yesterday, but the Guardian and the Telegraph both focused on the Prime Minister's difficulties with getting Brexit done. One can only assume that there was either tacit or explicit agreement amongst the allies that any public comments suggesting de-escalation would be counterproductive, given Trump's strained relations with European leaders, and that private communications would be more effective. They seem to have concluded that allowing Trump to take the limelight and the credit for stating the obvious is an important prerequisite to achieving their international policy goals.
An almost presidential address
Today was a pivotal moment in history: how would Trump respond to the previous day's ballistic missile strike by Iran? In an address to the nation, clearly warranted given the gravity of the situation Trump had largely created through the assassination of Qasem Suleimani, his challenge was two-fold; how to appear presidential and speak for the nation and what to do given the current situation. He managed, surprisingly, to steer a better course than expected on policy, but managed to not quite hit the mark on tone.
On policy, he stepped back from the brink and elected not to respond militarily to Iran's strike. That is to be applauded. Whether his fear of foreign entanglements in the run up to the next election or his military advisers were responsible for this decision is as yet unclear but the outcome is nonetheless welcome. The decision to de-escalate and not respond militarily is a momentous change in direction.
The path forward he set out is astonishingly multilateral, involving the original signatories to the JCPOA and NATO, an organization whose relevance he has repeatedly questioned. He appeared to be opening the door to negotiations, though given the gravity of the last few days it will be some time before Iran will be able to enter into dialog; Iran's domestic audience would not countenance a rapid resumption of talks.
On tone, he clearly struggled but on balance managed to come across as "mostly presidential". He stuck to the carefully worded script and no off the cuff additions. His tone of voice was appropriately somber. He didn't mention his Congressional adversaries or impeachment. He couldn't, however, resist taking a jab at his predecessor, and repeated the lie that Obama had "given" Iran billions of dollars.
Moving forward, the promised sanctions afford a degree to flexibility in severity that a military response would have precluded. The GOP will claim victory (with the killing of Suleimani) and Iran will too (with a militarily un-answered the missile strike), and the world will have narrowly avoided another calamitous war. Everyone can now exhale.
On policy, he stepped back from the brink and elected not to respond militarily to Iran's strike. That is to be applauded. Whether his fear of foreign entanglements in the run up to the next election or his military advisers were responsible for this decision is as yet unclear but the outcome is nonetheless welcome. The decision to de-escalate and not respond militarily is a momentous change in direction.
The path forward he set out is astonishingly multilateral, involving the original signatories to the JCPOA and NATO, an organization whose relevance he has repeatedly questioned. He appeared to be opening the door to negotiations, though given the gravity of the last few days it will be some time before Iran will be able to enter into dialog; Iran's domestic audience would not countenance a rapid resumption of talks.
On tone, he clearly struggled but on balance managed to come across as "mostly presidential". He stuck to the carefully worded script and no off the cuff additions. His tone of voice was appropriately somber. He didn't mention his Congressional adversaries or impeachment. He couldn't, however, resist taking a jab at his predecessor, and repeated the lie that Obama had "given" Iran billions of dollars.
Moving forward, the promised sanctions afford a degree to flexibility in severity that a military response would have precluded. The GOP will claim victory (with the killing of Suleimani) and Iran will too (with a militarily un-answered the missile strike), and the world will have narrowly avoided another calamitous war. Everyone can now exhale.
"How do I know what I think till I hear what I say"?
Variously attributed to E.M Forester and Marilyn Monroe, this seems to capture Trump's deliberative process. Most of us were cautioned to think before we speak. Trump, on the other hand, operates very differently. He has no filter, blurting out whatever thought wanders into his mind and then waits to see how it lands.
The likelihood of it becoming "policy" is negatively related to the ensuing outrage among "loyalists" and positively related to the degree to which it upsets his perceived enemies. It is an enormously efficient heuristic, one that offloads the heavy burden of carefully thinking things through to those around him.
The likelihood of it becoming "policy" is negatively related to the ensuing outrage among "loyalists" and positively related to the degree to which it upsets his perceived enemies. It is an enormously efficient heuristic, one that offloads the heavy burden of carefully thinking things through to those around him.
Fox Blinks
The guests on Fox this morning were unanimous in calling for de-escalation. Neither did the more news-worthy hosts on at 7am adopt their customary bellicose swagger. One even pressed a GOP member of Congress on the imminence of the attack on which the killing of Suleimani was predicated, an uncharacteristically aggressive question for a Fox anchor. Even the "Fox & Friends" show, usually among the most ridiculous crews the network has to offer, had moved from its usual couch-based format to a desk.
With reality staring them starkly in the face, Fox' presenters (and presumably producers) blinked. One can only hope that coming to grips with the consequences of unhinged bravado will lead to a more serious approach to its job both on the news and the propaganda sides of the network.
With reality staring them starkly in the face, Fox' presenters (and presumably producers) blinked. One can only hope that coming to grips with the consequences of unhinged bravado will lead to a more serious approach to its job both on the news and the propaganda sides of the network.
Tuesday, January 7, 2020
Choosing one's words carefully
Mike Pompeo, when questioned today about Trump's threat to bomb cultural sites in Iran, maintained adamantly that the administration would not break the law. He was, however, careful not to mention bombing of cultural sites in his answer.
He could have replied quite simply that the administration would not bomb cultural sites, yet on several occasions he used the same language about not breaking the law and did not say explicitly that cultural sites would be off-limits.
There seem to be two possible explanations. One is that he is being careful not to contradict his boss explicitly, but that presupposes Trumps is too dense to see "not breaking the law" as meaning not bombing cultural sites. And while I have my doubts about Trump's claim of being a "very stable genius", I doubt that he couldn't make that connection.
That leaves the the alternative explanation; that the administration believes either it has found a legal justification for bombing cultural sites (much in the same was that Cheaney and Busy sought to find a legal justification for torturing detainees), or that it does not recognise the jurisdiction of a supranational legal system, and since there may not be any US laws precluding such action, they would thus deem it legal.
Missing from all the discussion of its legality, the central question must be what would it accomplish? The answer is nothing of any benefit militarily, but it would certainly inflame anti-American sentiments in the Middle East.
He could have replied quite simply that the administration would not bomb cultural sites, yet on several occasions he used the same language about not breaking the law and did not say explicitly that cultural sites would be off-limits.
There seem to be two possible explanations. One is that he is being careful not to contradict his boss explicitly, but that presupposes Trumps is too dense to see "not breaking the law" as meaning not bombing cultural sites. And while I have my doubts about Trump's claim of being a "very stable genius", I doubt that he couldn't make that connection.
That leaves the the alternative explanation; that the administration believes either it has found a legal justification for bombing cultural sites (much in the same was that Cheaney and Busy sought to find a legal justification for torturing detainees), or that it does not recognise the jurisdiction of a supranational legal system, and since there may not be any US laws precluding such action, they would thus deem it legal.
Missing from all the discussion of its legality, the central question must be what would it accomplish? The answer is nothing of any benefit militarily, but it would certainly inflame anti-American sentiments in the Middle East.
The Moment of Truth Arrives
Iran this evening responded to Donald Trump's assassination of Qasem Suleimani but launching a ballistic missile strike from within Iran at US military targets in Iraq. A demonstrable response was expected. As well informed commentators noted (and as I did also) this was in part an inevitable effort to placate an angry domestic audience that was aggrieved that its sovereignty has been violated.
From what is being reported, the strike appears to have been carefully designed and calibrated to signal Iran's capabilities and its willingness to use them, while at the same time causing relatively few casualties, none of whom appear to be American. It provides a turning point at which deescalation might be achieved; the strike assuages Iranian domestic ire but does so without crossing Trump's red-line of another American death.
This is a moment of truth for Trump and the country.
His choice is clear. He can back down from his intemperate tweeting and ill-considered impulsive decision making, and turn instead to the diplomats to talk both sides down from the ledge. Of course, that's problematic since Mike Pompeo, who is more consistently bellicose than Trump, heads the State Department. But that would be the thoughtful, statesman-like and courageous move. And I very much doubt he's is up to it.
A more likely outcome is that his insecurity, vanity and fear of appearing to lose face will prevail; he will up the ante with a strike against targets inside Iran, to all intents and purposes thereby declaring war. If this is where we are headed, Trump will have single-handedly started a war of choice.
His decision in the next few hours could reshape the world order and have irrevocable consequences for years to come; it is, without doubt, the most critical moment, not only of his presidency, but the most momentous for the country since deciding to invade Iraq.
While Trump must take responsibility for the mess we are now in and the graver one we likely will be in by tomorrow, the GOP must shoulder an appreciable portion of blame. Its failure to stand up to Trump makes it complicit; its members stood quietly by as he emerged as the front-runner in the 2016 primaries; they allowed him to lie to the public on a daily basis without challenge or correction; many of them blithely repeated his lies; they looked the other way as he violated the constitution and the separation of powers. They have created a monster (or at least allowed one to assume the throne) and we will all be the lucky beneficiaries as he continues to flounder, causing mayhem and carnage. For any thinking Americans now having second thoughts about their voting choices in 2016, all I can say is "you had fair warning".
From what is being reported, the strike appears to have been carefully designed and calibrated to signal Iran's capabilities and its willingness to use them, while at the same time causing relatively few casualties, none of whom appear to be American. It provides a turning point at which deescalation might be achieved; the strike assuages Iranian domestic ire but does so without crossing Trump's red-line of another American death.
This is a moment of truth for Trump and the country.
His choice is clear. He can back down from his intemperate tweeting and ill-considered impulsive decision making, and turn instead to the diplomats to talk both sides down from the ledge. Of course, that's problematic since Mike Pompeo, who is more consistently bellicose than Trump, heads the State Department. But that would be the thoughtful, statesman-like and courageous move. And I very much doubt he's is up to it.
A more likely outcome is that his insecurity, vanity and fear of appearing to lose face will prevail; he will up the ante with a strike against targets inside Iran, to all intents and purposes thereby declaring war. If this is where we are headed, Trump will have single-handedly started a war of choice.
His decision in the next few hours could reshape the world order and have irrevocable consequences for years to come; it is, without doubt, the most critical moment, not only of his presidency, but the most momentous for the country since deciding to invade Iraq.
While Trump must take responsibility for the mess we are now in and the graver one we likely will be in by tomorrow, the GOP must shoulder an appreciable portion of blame. Its failure to stand up to Trump makes it complicit; its members stood quietly by as he emerged as the front-runner in the 2016 primaries; they allowed him to lie to the public on a daily basis without challenge or correction; many of them blithely repeated his lies; they looked the other way as he violated the constitution and the separation of powers. They have created a monster (or at least allowed one to assume the throne) and we will all be the lucky beneficiaries as he continues to flounder, causing mayhem and carnage. For any thinking Americans now having second thoughts about their voting choices in 2016, all I can say is "you had fair warning".
Monday, January 6, 2020
Why now, why this?
It is taken as read that Qasem Suleimani was engaged in actions that led to the death of many Americans. How he might be held to account is a complicated question (unless you are one of the mind-numbingly infantile Fox News crowd from whom everything is "real simple"). He was a government official in another country; it is unlikely that he would ever be held accountable in the US, although a case might be brought the ICC. Trump, who does no acknowledge that any supranational body has jurisdiction will argue that since he can't be brought to justice in the US, extrajudicial killing was the only option. But holding Suleimani to account for his past is not what the administration is arguing was the justification for the attack. It is claiming that it was necessary to prevent an imminent attack on US persons, and thus was permissible under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the War Powers Act. That's the legal justification for not consulting Congress. A Congressional declaration of war would have been not only unlikely to pass but would have made any covert operation impossible. So an AUMF- or War Powers Act-based authorization may have been appropriate.
If so, two question need answers. First is why now? So far the administration has been circumspect as to the nature and timing of the imminent attack. So we need to know what the intelligence community concluded was being planned and when. This gets messy, first because the question only arises because the AUMF was invoked. And its use is contingent on the choice of action to be taken to respond to Iran's escalating meddling
The second question, and arguably the larger one, is not whether to have struck back, but how. There is a good case that to do nothing in response to the killing of an American contractor given the history of Iran's and its proxies actions (the strike against the Saudi refinery, the mining of tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, and the downing of a US drone), would be taken as weakness and a license for Iran to push further in an effort to extract concessions on economically crippling sanctions. Diplomatic channels, for whatever reason, were no longer a viable means of curtailing Iran's activities. That is largely a function of a choice made by this administration in favoring confrontation and threats of force over diplomacy. But the question of whether killing someone who was the Iranian equivalent of the Director of National Security of the CIA Director was the most effective way of dealing with Iran's posture is critical. Likely a menu of retaliatory actions were presented to Trump - indeed it appears it was something Pompeo had been discussion privately for some months - and it is possible that this was presented to Trump as a target of opportunity, an opportunity he took thinking it would help him win the next election. It is almost certain, given what we know about his management "style", that he made the decision impulsively with no clear understanding of its ramifications. As Oliver Hardy might have said "Well here's another fine mess you've gotten us into".
If so, two question need answers. First is why now? So far the administration has been circumspect as to the nature and timing of the imminent attack. So we need to know what the intelligence community concluded was being planned and when. This gets messy, first because the question only arises because the AUMF was invoked. And its use is contingent on the choice of action to be taken to respond to Iran's escalating meddling
The second question, and arguably the larger one, is not whether to have struck back, but how. There is a good case that to do nothing in response to the killing of an American contractor given the history of Iran's and its proxies actions (the strike against the Saudi refinery, the mining of tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, and the downing of a US drone), would be taken as weakness and a license for Iran to push further in an effort to extract concessions on economically crippling sanctions. Diplomatic channels, for whatever reason, were no longer a viable means of curtailing Iran's activities. That is largely a function of a choice made by this administration in favoring confrontation and threats of force over diplomacy. But the question of whether killing someone who was the Iranian equivalent of the Director of National Security of the CIA Director was the most effective way of dealing with Iran's posture is critical. Likely a menu of retaliatory actions were presented to Trump - indeed it appears it was something Pompeo had been discussion privately for some months - and it is possible that this was presented to Trump as a target of opportunity, an opportunity he took thinking it would help him win the next election. It is almost certain, given what we know about his management "style", that he made the decision impulsively with no clear understanding of its ramifications. As Oliver Hardy might have said "Well here's another fine mess you've gotten us into".
Assassination, war crimes and other language
If the US is not at war with Iran, then the extrajudicial killing of Suleimani is an assassination, that is the killing of a prominent persona, a senior government or a political figure in peace time. And since a declaration of war, an authority granted by the Constitution to Congress alone, has not been made, we are not technically at war with Iran. The action was undertaken either under the auspices of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the War Powers Act that limits the scope of executive branch authority under Article II (the authority to declare war is granted to Congress Article I). But whatever one calls it, the first question should really be "what are its implications"?
Suleimani killing may have the intended effect of disrupting attacks on American targets, though no one is irreplaceable and if Iran decides to continue on its current course, his assassination may only serve to delay whatever it is being alleged was being planned (and "imminent"). The expected by-product is a ratcheting up of tension and the inevitable threat from Iran to retaliate (which elicited a predictably intemperate tweet from Donald Trump). But there are divergences from the purported expectation in two directions; there are things that were expected that likely won't happen and there are those that weren't that will.
It seems as though the administration has again failed to understand the way its actions would be seen abroad. It misjudged the reaction in Iran where throngs gathered to mourn the killing of one of their highest ranking government officials. While the Americans see Suleimani as a violent terrorist who supported and organized killings outside of Iran, as Trump himself has admitted, the CIA does much the same thing yet we don't consider its director a terrorist. Hence, there is considerable uncertainty as to Iran's response. While the administration hoped that Suleimani killing might have had a deterrent effect, the popular outrage in Iran puts its leaders in a bind. Their hands are now more tightly tied to a robust demonstration of retaliation in order to placate their domestic audience. The range of likely responses is now less predictable and arguably more troubling that those Iran has deployed in its foreign meddling to date. That in turn, given Trump's lack of impulse control and his need to appear tough to his base ahead of the election later this year, sets us on an upward spiral of escalating military action (including cyber) with no clear off-ramps.
The administration was also apparently unprepared, at least according to Mike Pompeo, for the lack of congratulatory high-fives from the Europeans. But since they weren't in on the surprise they were understandably underwhelmed; they might also, had they been forewarned, have advised against this course of action since they would have argued that it would have scuppered any hope of Iran adhering to the JCPOA, let alone coming back to the table to negotiate a more stringent (or at least a non-Obama) deal Trump appears to want.
That lack of understanding was also on full display (as was the lack of deliberation) when Trump tweeted that he would launch strikes against "cultural targets". Regardless or the fact that this is considered a war crime - Trump, in common with tin-pot dictators the world over, does not acknowledge legal jurisdiction to any supranational body, again the question should be what would such an action accomplish. It clearly would have no direct military significance; cultural artifacts are about as far as you can get from instruments or war. But it would clearly have a profound psychological impact, not only in Iran, but for all Shia Muslims in the region and potentially resonate around the world. America would clearly have ceded any moral high ground and provoked anti-America fervor in a large swath of the world's population, all of which makes
And finally it's worth noting Pompeo's answer to Jake Tapper's question about the timing of the threat on which the attack was predicated. When asked whether this was days or weeks, Pompeo said "if you're and American in the region, days and weeks... this is not something that's relevant.” That is in essence an admission that the threat was not at all "imminent", and thus the use of force could not be justified under the AUMF. Congress therefore has every right argue that the attack should not have been carried out without Congressional approval.
Americans, by and large are more invested in strong individuals and leaders and faceless institutions, but that has led increasingly since 911 to the shifting of power from Congress to the Presidency. Trump is that best illustration to date of just how big a problem that is.
Suleimani killing may have the intended effect of disrupting attacks on American targets, though no one is irreplaceable and if Iran decides to continue on its current course, his assassination may only serve to delay whatever it is being alleged was being planned (and "imminent"). The expected by-product is a ratcheting up of tension and the inevitable threat from Iran to retaliate (which elicited a predictably intemperate tweet from Donald Trump). But there are divergences from the purported expectation in two directions; there are things that were expected that likely won't happen and there are those that weren't that will.
It seems as though the administration has again failed to understand the way its actions would be seen abroad. It misjudged the reaction in Iran where throngs gathered to mourn the killing of one of their highest ranking government officials. While the Americans see Suleimani as a violent terrorist who supported and organized killings outside of Iran, as Trump himself has admitted, the CIA does much the same thing yet we don't consider its director a terrorist. Hence, there is considerable uncertainty as to Iran's response. While the administration hoped that Suleimani killing might have had a deterrent effect, the popular outrage in Iran puts its leaders in a bind. Their hands are now more tightly tied to a robust demonstration of retaliation in order to placate their domestic audience. The range of likely responses is now less predictable and arguably more troubling that those Iran has deployed in its foreign meddling to date. That in turn, given Trump's lack of impulse control and his need to appear tough to his base ahead of the election later this year, sets us on an upward spiral of escalating military action (including cyber) with no clear off-ramps.
The administration was also apparently unprepared, at least according to Mike Pompeo, for the lack of congratulatory high-fives from the Europeans. But since they weren't in on the surprise they were understandably underwhelmed; they might also, had they been forewarned, have advised against this course of action since they would have argued that it would have scuppered any hope of Iran adhering to the JCPOA, let alone coming back to the table to negotiate a more stringent (or at least a non-Obama) deal Trump appears to want.
That lack of understanding was also on full display (as was the lack of deliberation) when Trump tweeted that he would launch strikes against "cultural targets". Regardless or the fact that this is considered a war crime - Trump, in common with tin-pot dictators the world over, does not acknowledge legal jurisdiction to any supranational body, again the question should be what would such an action accomplish. It clearly would have no direct military significance; cultural artifacts are about as far as you can get from instruments or war. But it would clearly have a profound psychological impact, not only in Iran, but for all Shia Muslims in the region and potentially resonate around the world. America would clearly have ceded any moral high ground and provoked anti-America fervor in a large swath of the world's population, all of which makes
And finally it's worth noting Pompeo's answer to Jake Tapper's question about the timing of the threat on which the attack was predicated. When asked whether this was days or weeks, Pompeo said "if you're and American in the region, days and weeks... this is not something that's relevant.” That is in essence an admission that the threat was not at all "imminent", and thus the use of force could not be justified under the AUMF. Congress therefore has every right argue that the attack should not have been carried out without Congressional approval.
Americans, by and large are more invested in strong individuals and leaders and faceless institutions, but that has led increasingly since 911 to the shifting of power from Congress to the Presidency. Trump is that best illustration to date of just how big a problem that is.
Bolton's promise
Bolton's statement today that he will testify before the Senate, if subpoenaed, is surprising. It's hard to see what his motivation for making this announcement is other than wanting to throw Trump under the bus. But, given their disagreements, and the way he was let go, and what has just happened in Iraq, that might well be what he plans to do, if called.
His decision might be a longer term play to distance himself from Trump without helping to embarrass him in order to ensure his political future with the GOP. For this he'd need to be relatively sure that he won't be subpoenaed. McConnell clearly doesn't want to call him to testify, but here his fate lies in the hands of the tiny number of Senators up for reelection in more moderate states.
What might be interesting is if Nancy Pelosi were to have the House Judiciary or Intelligence committees subpoena him, and offer to add his testimony to the evidence to be presented as part of the articles of impeachment. She might even have Judiciary and the House amend the articles themselves. Bolton would then be in an awkward position of having to decide whether to honor a House subpoena, having already said he honor one from the Senate since to refuse would expose his offer today as a ruse. That would certainly hurt any political ambitions he might be harbouring.
His decision might be a longer term play to distance himself from Trump without helping to embarrass him in order to ensure his political future with the GOP. For this he'd need to be relatively sure that he won't be subpoenaed. McConnell clearly doesn't want to call him to testify, but here his fate lies in the hands of the tiny number of Senators up for reelection in more moderate states.What might be interesting is if Nancy Pelosi were to have the House Judiciary or Intelligence committees subpoena him, and offer to add his testimony to the evidence to be presented as part of the articles of impeachment. She might even have Judiciary and the House amend the articles themselves. Bolton would then be in an awkward position of having to decide whether to honor a House subpoena, having already said he honor one from the Senate since to refuse would expose his offer today as a ruse. That would certainly hurt any political ambitions he might be harbouring.
Sunday, January 5, 2020
Fun fact
According to a YouTube home made documentary, John Lennon's first guitar, bought in 1957, cost £10. Taking inflation into account that's £243 in 2019 pounds, or $316 at current exchange rates. For a working class kid with a single parent, that's a tidy sum! His second guitar cost £17 in 1959, which is £398 2019 pounds, or $517. That's almost as much as I recently paid for my bottom-of-the-line Gibson SG - and I'm comfortably middle-aged and lower middle class.
Qasem Suleimani: the Aftermath
Global GPS was particularly interesting this week, with three well informed, intelligent and articulate panel discussants: Megan O'Sullivan, Richard Haas and Peter Beinart. The contrast to the ignorant, visceral ranting on Fox and Friends was as sobering as it was stark (a context in which Lindsey Graham sounded almost statesmanlike)!
Megan O'Sullivan noted that the thinking behind Qasem Suleinani's assassination may have been to trigger regime change. She also expressed some scepticism as to the justification of an "imminent threat" given that usually information would by now have been made available to allies and to Congress; that it has not raises legitimate questions.
Richard Haas noted that the decision, rather than aiding regime change, appears to have accomplished the opposite, turning popular animosity in both Iran and Iraq away from their governments and directing it towards the United States.
And as Peter Beinart noted, it is noteworthy (thought in my view not in the least surprising; it appears to be a "feature" of the political right) that a politician who so depends on nationalist sentiment is unable to see how the interference by a foreign power, particularly one that is seen by many in the region as overbearing and mettlesome, would play badly in another country. Beinart also suggested that some in the administration would like to start a war with Iran as a means of destroying militarily it's bomb-making capability; John Bolton's name springs immediately to mind even though he is no longer employed there.
After the show aired this morning two significant developments unfolded in short order. First, Iran announced that it was abandoning the JCPOA. While it's recent transgressions were aimed at applying pressure to the allies to re-engage with the deal, it has evidently decided that this is no longer a viable alternative. It seems likely that it will now move as fast as it can to acquiring a nuclear weapon. The outcome will be that the region will have two nuclear powers, making it only the second after India and Pakistan to have two nuclear-armed adversaries (North Korea and China are not technically adversaries). That will be a problem for Israel, whose strategic options in defending itself are now more complicated and limited. The second development was the vote taken in the Iraqi parliament to expels US troops from the country, further reducing US influence in the region. Whether that puts the Homeland and Americans at greater risk is unclear, but it necessitates a shift in US regional policy.
A risky decision has produced a significant shift in the world order in a matter of hours. I suggested two days ago that the decision was high risk setting a damaging precedent and disrupting norms that have taken years to establish, norms which have made the world generally a safer place safer. I thought then that it might take some time to see the ramifications of that decision but it appears we are seeing clear signs much earlier than I anticipated.
Megan O'Sullivan noted that the thinking behind Qasem Suleinani's assassination may have been to trigger regime change. She also expressed some scepticism as to the justification of an "imminent threat" given that usually information would by now have been made available to allies and to Congress; that it has not raises legitimate questions.
Richard Haas noted that the decision, rather than aiding regime change, appears to have accomplished the opposite, turning popular animosity in both Iran and Iraq away from their governments and directing it towards the United States.
And as Peter Beinart noted, it is noteworthy (thought in my view not in the least surprising; it appears to be a "feature" of the political right) that a politician who so depends on nationalist sentiment is unable to see how the interference by a foreign power, particularly one that is seen by many in the region as overbearing and mettlesome, would play badly in another country. Beinart also suggested that some in the administration would like to start a war with Iran as a means of destroying militarily it's bomb-making capability; John Bolton's name springs immediately to mind even though he is no longer employed there.
After the show aired this morning two significant developments unfolded in short order. First, Iran announced that it was abandoning the JCPOA. While it's recent transgressions were aimed at applying pressure to the allies to re-engage with the deal, it has evidently decided that this is no longer a viable alternative. It seems likely that it will now move as fast as it can to acquiring a nuclear weapon. The outcome will be that the region will have two nuclear powers, making it only the second after India and Pakistan to have two nuclear-armed adversaries (North Korea and China are not technically adversaries). That will be a problem for Israel, whose strategic options in defending itself are now more complicated and limited. The second development was the vote taken in the Iraqi parliament to expels US troops from the country, further reducing US influence in the region. Whether that puts the Homeland and Americans at greater risk is unclear, but it necessitates a shift in US regional policy.
A risky decision has produced a significant shift in the world order in a matter of hours. I suggested two days ago that the decision was high risk setting a damaging precedent and disrupting norms that have taken years to establish, norms which have made the world generally a safer place safer. I thought then that it might take some time to see the ramifications of that decision but it appears we are seeing clear signs much earlier than I anticipated.
Friday, January 3, 2020
Qasem Soleimani
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| The remains of a vehicle hit by missiles launched from a US drone outside the Baghdad airport. Iraqi Prime Minister Press Office, via Associated Press |
US allies and Congress are both upset that such a significant decision was taken without consultation. The ramifications of Soleimani's killing may be enormous and are very hard to predict. Informal norms of international behavior suggest that while extrajudicial killings of foreign nationals are not unusual, what makes this so shocking is Soleimani's position. While low level operatives and civilian terrorists have been targeted in the past, it is unprecedented in modern times for a top government official to be targeted.
The implications are many; a precedent has been set that makes it 'acceptable' to target foreign leaders. Diplomacy is now off the table when it comes to the US' relations with Iran. Any chance of a new nuclear deal has been quashed. Iran may now accelerate its development of atomic power and weapons. Support for US policy in Iraq will decline and its role as a US regional partner has been severely diminished. Americans in the region, both military and civilian, will be at much greater risk of coordinated and lone wolf retaliation.
Further afield, authoritarian regimes around the world will see this as a green light for the increased exercise of regional power though military action. Russia will be emboldened, putting Eastern Europe and the Baltic states at greater risk. China will expand its military activities in the South China Sea, further polarizing and already fracturing world order. Europe will face in increasingly difficult position between Russia on its Eastern doorstep and the US to the West, not to mention the China-US divide.
The decision to kill Qasem Soleimani will certainly change the course of history. It is too early to say whether this will be for the better. By upsetting generally accepted norms, significant decisions affecting the world order will now rely less on precedent and more on political power and calculus, making the future far less predictable.
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